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I. INTRODUCTION
The doctrine of collateral estoppel involves the use of an old judgment
in a new action to prevent the relitigation of issues resolved by that old
judgment. At common law, use of the doctrine required that the party
using collateral estoppel and the party against whom it was used be the
same as the parties to the prior judgment. This common law requirement
of mutuality has been relaxed and since the United States Supreme
Court's 1979 decision in Parklane Hoisery Co. v. Shore,1 the strict com-
mon law requirement of mutuality has all but completely vanished. In
Parklane the Court sanctioned the use of collateral estoppel by a plaintiff
who was a stranger to the original suit against a defendant who was party
to that suit.
The courts' search for fair results and judicial economy in the applica-
tion of the doctrine led to this application of the doctrine in circum-
stances in which the parties were not mutual. This note traces the un-
steady course which the doctrine of collateral estoppel traveled before
Parklane. The significance of the Court's decision in Parklane is then
analyzed. Finally, post-Parklane applications of collateral estoppel are
discussed, including the effect of the use of collateral estoppel on the sev-
enth amendment right to jury trial and its impact on substantive areas of
law.
II. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL: BACKGROUND TO Parklane
A. Distinction Between Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Both res judicata and collateral estoppel are part of the doctrine of pre-
1. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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clusion by prior adjudication. Preclusion by prior adjudication comes into
play when a court renders a valid and final judgment on the merits of a
controversy. This judgment is then used to decide the outcome of a later
court action and the first judgment can, in fact, bar relitigation in the
second suit of the entire claim (res judicata) or of a particular issue (col-
lateral estoppel).2
The doctrine of preclusion by prior adjudication gives rise to a conflict
between two fundamental goals of the law of procedure. On the one hand,
rules of procedure aim at permitting the full development of each party's
case, so that the merits of the case will dictate the fairness of its outcome.
Yet, on the other hand, procedural rules seek to bring an adjudication to
a final conclusion with reasonable promptness.3 Both res judicata and col-
lateral estoppel have the same objectives of promoting fairness and judi-
cial economy.4 But here the similarities end.
The crucial distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel was
noted by the Supreme Court in Lawlor v. National Screen Servicer
[U]nder the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment 'on the merits' in a prior
suit involving the same parties or their privies bars a second suit based on
the same cause of action. Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, on the
other hand, such a judgment precludes relitigation of issues actually liti-
gated and determined in the prior suit, regardless of whether it was based
on the same cause of action as the second suit.
Consequently, it is essential that a claim be characterized as either seek-
ing to preclude an entire cause of action or a particular issue. More par-
ticularly, the Supreme Court has also said that in res judicata
The judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim or demand in controversy,
concluding parties and those in privity with them, not only as to every mat-
ter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand,
but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for
that purpose.6
To illustrate the effect of res judicata assume that A sues B for an al-
leged injury. Once a court of competent jurisdiction renders a final valid
judgment on the merits of the case, both A and B are bound by the judg-
ment and may not repeat the suit. If A, the plaintiff, is victorious, then all
possible claims which he might have raised under the cause of action are
extinguished or are "merged" into the judgment, and he may not sue
2. 1B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcTic. 0.405[1] at 621 (2d ed. 1980).
3. F. JAiEs & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.2 at 529-30 (2d ed. 1977).
4. 1B J. MOORE, supra note 2, T 0.405[1] at 623.
5. 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
6. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876).
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again on any claim he omitted from the original action.7 Conversely, a
judgment for the defendant "bars" or extinguishes his entire claim or de-
fense and all the issues which he did or might have raised under it.$
In distinguishing res judicata from collateral estoppel, it is crucial to
note that the doctrine of res judicata does not preclude any single issue.
Rather, it acts as a bar to further litigation of the cause of action between
the same parties as to every issue or defense raised and as to those which
may have been presented. This application of the doctrine is known as
preventing the "splitting of a cause of action. '
In contrast to res judicata, collateral estoppel bars relitigation of spe-
cific issues. "[T]he inquiry must always be as to the point or question
actually litigated and determined in the original action, not what might
have been thus litigated and determined. Only upon such matters is the
judgment conclusive in another action."'10 Assume A sues B for personal
injuries based on B's alleged intent to cause bodily harm. In a later suit
between the two on related property damage, B may not reopen the issue
of his intent to do harm to A. The issue of intent was actually litigated
and necessarily determined in order to arrive at an adjudication of the
alleged intentional tort in the first suit. Relitigation of that issue is barred
by collateral estoppel.
The terms res judicata and collateral estoppel have been used. inter-
changeably by the courts.1 However, it is clear that the main distinction
betweenres judicata and collateral estoppel is that collateral estoppel
may be invoked in a second suit even though it involves a different cause
of action from the first suit.
B. The Requirement of Mutuality
The successful use of collateral estoppel, which is also known as issue
preclusion 2 and estoppel by judgment,' requires that the party invoking
it show that in the prior action the same issue was in question; that the
issue was actually litigated by the parties; and that the issue was necessa-
rily determined. 4 One of the major problems courts have faced in apply-
7. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 3, § 11.3 at 533.
8. Id.
9. 1B J. MOORE, supra note 2, % 0.44112] at 3775-79.
10. 94 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added).
11. Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1947). The practitioner must be alert
to the interchange and focus on the type of preclusion intended in the language. See, e.g., 94
U.S. at 352; 1B J. MOORE, supra note 2, 1 0.441[1] at 3773.
12. Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Parties, 50 IOWA L. REv. 27, 28 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912); 94 U.S. at 353.
14. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 3, § 11.16 at 563-64. See text accompanying note
10 supra. Compare 1B J. MOORE, supra note 2, 1 0.441[2] at 3775-76 with RESTATEMENT
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ing this doctrine is that of determining the parties against whom the doc-
trine should apply. If the party asserting collateral estoppel and the party
against whom it is applied are both bound by the prior judgment, collat-
eral estoppel clearly applies. The so called-doctrine of mutuality,15 requir-
ing that the parties in the second suit be the same or be in privity with
the parties in the first suit and therefore bound by the prior judgment, is
satisfied.
Difficulty arises when a non-party in the first suit-a "stranger" to the
prior judgment-attempts to prevent the relitigation of an issue in the
second suit.16 This situation is known as "nonmutuality" of judgment.
More specifically, the party in the previous suit is bound by the judg-
ment. His opponent, the "stranger," who is not bound by it, seeks to use
the judgment to his advantage.
Collateral estoppel may be pleaded in two different ways where the
parties are not identical. "Defensive use" occurs when a stranger to the
prior judgment asserts the prior judgment as a "shield" against a plaintiff
who was a party to the first suit.17 "Offensive use" of collateral estoppel
arises where a plaintiff who is a stranger to the first suit seeks to assert
collateral estoppel as a "sword" against a defendant who is bound by the
prior judgment.'8 In both cases, the party who is asserting collateral es-
toppel is a stranger to the judgment and therefore not bouund by it, but
seeks to assert the judgment against the party who is bound.
Initially, the invocation of collateral estoppel was limited by the doc-
trine of mutuality. 9 In the interest of fairness, the mutuality requirement
prevented a litigant from invoking the conclusive effect of a judgment
unless that litigant would have been bound if the judgment had gone the
other way.2GThus the use of collateral estoppel was limited to the parties
in the prior suit and their privies. 2' A stranger to the judgment, having
"no legal right to defend or control the proceedings, nor to appeal from
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
15. 1B J. MOORE, supra note 2, 1 0.412[1] at 1801; Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Con-
clusiveness of Judgments, 35 TuL. L. REv. 301, 302 (1961). See, e.g., Adamson v. Hill, 202
Kan. 482, _, 449 P.2d 536, 539 (1969).
16. Vestal, supra note 12, at 46.
17. 202 Kan. at -, 449 P.2d at 540.
18. Id.
19. "It is a principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be
mutual." Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912).
20. 1B J. MooRE, supra note 2, 0.412[1] at 1801; Moore & Currier, supra note 15, at 302;
Comment, Collateral Estoppel: The Changing Role of the Rule of Mutuality, 41 Mo. L.
REV. 521, 522 (1976).
21. A judgment not only estops those who were actually parties but also such persons as
were represented by those who were or claim under or in privity with them....
Hence, all privies, whether in estate, in blood, or in law, are estopped from litigating
that which is conclusive upon him with whom they are in privity.
225 U.S. at 128-29.
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the decree '22 was not bound and could not invoke the prior judgment to
prevent relitigation of an issue previously determined by a court.
The doctrine of mutuality was rigid and, therefore, an "apparent excep-
tion" developed early.28 The exception essentially focused on the princi-
ple of vicarious liability. No mutuality was required "where the liability
of the defendant [was] altogether dependent upon the culpability of one
exonerated in a prior suit, upon the same facts when sued by the same
plaintiff."'
24
The exception was justified on the grounds that intolerable "injustice
• . . would result in allowing a recovery against a defendant for conduct
of another when that other [had been] exonerated in a direct suit. '25 In
other words, in cases of derivative liability such as indemnitor/indemnitee
situations and employer/employee situations, the spectre of inconsistent
judgments was intolerable even for mutuality-bound courts. Thus, the
courts found it necessary to create an exception in order to avoid the
unfair anomaly of inconsistent judgments which might occur if the in-
demnitor were to be found liable and the active party exonerated.26
This traditional vicarious liability exception to the mutuality rule is
recognized in the Restatement of the Law (Second) of Judgments,27 and
it is applied today even in jurisdictions which adhere to the mutuality
rule.28 This exception has only been applied to the defensive use of collat-
eral estoppel. That is, counsel for the defense may assert collateral estop-
pel as a shield against a plaintiff seeking a second chance to collect dam-
ages. To illustrate, once having tried and failed to establish the liability of
a negligent truckdriver, a plaintiff may not seek damages again from the
owner of the truck. The vicarious liability exception will allow the owner
to assert collateral estoppel defensively.
The development of this well established exception to the requirement
of mutuality did not end criticism of the doctrine.29 Over a century ago
Jeremy Bentham ridiculed the theory that justice is not advanced merely
because the party asserting the estoppel was not a party to the previous
22. Id. at 126.
23. Id. at 127-28.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 128.
26. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. REv. 281, 306 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Currie, Mutuality].
27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 99 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
28. gee, e.g., Frisby v. Hurley, 236 Ark. 127, 364 S.W.2d 801 (1963); Hinton v. Iowa Nat.
Mut. Ins. Co., 317 So. 2d 832 (Fla. App. 1975). For its application in jurisdictions where the
mutuality rule has been repudiated, see Lober v. Moore, 417 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (col-
lecting many decisions); Eistrat v. Irving Lumber & Moulding Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 382, 26
Cal. Rptr. 520 (1963).




suit.3 0 As the mutuality rule slowly eroded, the role of collateral estoppel
in its application to strangers to the prior judgment altered.3 ' The con-
tention is that as long as the party against whom collateral estoppel is
asserted has had his day in court, fairness, justice and judicial economy
are well served.32
C. The Demise of Mutuality: The Bernhard Doctrine
The modern demise of mutuality of estoppel was precipitated by the
landmark decision written for a unanimous California court by Justice
Traynor in Bernhard v. Bank of American National Trust & Savings As-
sociation.3 3 Bernhard had been preceded by litigation in which Mrs.
Sather, an ailing elderly woman who made her home with the Cooks, had
authorized Cook and another individual to make drafts jointly against an
existing account. Cook subsequently opened a commercial account at a
second bank in the name "Clara Sather by Charles 0. Cook" and, without
authorization from Sather, deposited and withdrew monies to cover her
expenses. Eventually, Mrs. Sather did authorize a transfer of the balance
of the funds in the first account to the account Cook had opened at the
second bank. Shortly before Sather died, Cook withdrew the funds from
this last mentioned account and deposited them in a separate account in
the name of himself and his wife.
When Cook, who administered Sather's estate, filed an account with
probate court accompanied by his resignation, Bernhard, along with other
beneficiaries under Sather's will, objected to the account because it omit-
ted the amounts withdrawn and transferred to Sather's second account.
However, the court upheld the validity of the account, and as part of its
order declared that the decedent during her lifetime had made a gift to
Cook in the amount of the deposit in question."
Bernhard succeeded Cook as administratrix of Sather's will, and insti-
tuted an action against the bank seeking to recover the deposit on the
ground that Sather had not authorized the withdrawal. The bank pleaded
two affirmative defenses: that the money on deposit was paid to Cook
with the consent of Sather, and that the probate court's ruling that
30. J. BENTHAt, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 WORKS OF JEREmy BENTHA 171
(Bowring ed. 1843), quoted in Currie, Mutuality, supra note 26, at 284 n.6.
31. Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 327
(1971).
32. See, e.g., Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1970) in which the court said:
The requirement that the party against whom estoppel is claimed must have had
his day in court is a recurring theme in the cases which led to the changing role of
mutuality in collateral estoppel. One court noted that the doctrine of collateral estop-
pel will not be applied unless it appears that the party against whom the estoppel is
asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
33. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1948).
34. Id. at 807, 122 P.2d at 893.
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Sather made a gift of the money in question to Cook was res judicata3s
Judgment was for the bank and plaintiff Bernhard appealed, arguing that
the doctrine of res judicata should not apply because the defendant was
not a party to the previous action, nor was he in privity with a party to
that action. Therefore there was no mutuality of estoppel.
The court used the language of res judicata. However, since the second
suit involved a different cause of action from that of the first suit, it is
clear that collateral estoppel, not res judicata, was intended.
The lower court's application of collateral estoppel was affirmed. The
court recognized that collateral estoppel "is based on the sound public
policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair
trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy,"3 6 merely by in-
voking the "facile formula" of mutuality. As to the "facile formula" of
mutuality, the court noted: "No satisfactory rationalization has been ad-
vanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not
bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res
judicata against a party who was bound by it is difficult to compre-
hend. '3 7 The question of the parties to whom collateral estoppel should
apply was addressed as follows:
The criteria for determining who may assert a plea of res judicata8 differ
fundamentally from the criteria for determining against whom a plea of res
judicata may be asserted. The requirements of due process of law forbid the
assertion of a plea of res judicata against a party unless he was bound by
the earlier litigation in which the matter was decided .... He is bound by
that litigation only if he has been a party thereto or in privity with a party
thereto .... There is no compelling reason, however, for requiring that the
party asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party, or in privity
with a party, to the earlier litigation.89
With those words, the Bernhard doctrine was molded. Under the doctrine
mutuality was abolished, and the question of whether one was a party or
in privity with a party to the prior action was deemed relevant only with
respect to the person against whom the plea is asserted.40
In Bernhard the court formulated a three pronged test to determine
the validity of a plea of collateral estoppel in the recurring and difficult
non-mutuality cases. The test requires an affirmative answer to the fol-
lowing questions. Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identi-
cal with the one presented in the action in question? Was there a final
35. Id. at 808, 122 P.2d at 894. See note 11 supra and accompanying text.
36. 19 Cal. 2d at 808, 122 P.2d at 894.
37. Id. at 808, 122 P.2d at 895.
38. The court uses res judicata interchangeably with collateral estoppel. See notes 11 &
35 supra.
39. 19 Cal. 2d at 808, 122 P.2d at 894.
40. Currie, Mutuality, supra note 26,.at 284.
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judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted
a party or in privity with a party in the prior adjudication? 4
In applying the new standard to the case at bar, the court found that
the issue of the money in question was identical; that the probate settle-
ment of the account was a final judgment on the merits; and, that Bern-
hard, against whom the plea of collateral estoppel was asserted, was a
party to the prior adjudication.42 The court further justified the results on
the ground of fairness. "[It] would be unjust to permit one who has had
his day in court to reopen identical issues by merely switching adversa-
ries. '43 Bernhard attempted unsuccessfully to recoup monies from Cook
in the first suit. In the second action, she attempted to recoup the same
sum by tactically switching her attack to the bank.
The significance of the Bernhard decision is that it sanctioned a third
situation in which collateral estoppel might be used. At the time Bern-
hard was decided, mutuality of parties was required, except in the well-
recognized exception of vicarious liability. Bernhard opened up the possi-
bility that a stranger to the first suit could plead collateral estoppel in a
second suit. The Bernhard decision charted a new direction for the appli-
cation of collateral estoppel in the troublesome area where mutuality was
lacking. The United States Supreme Court upheld the defensive use of
collateral estoppel by strangers to the original judgment in Blonder-
Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois.44
D. Defensive Use of Collateral Estoppel After Bernhard
1. Adoption of the Defensive Use of Collateral Estoppel
It has been observed that just as blind adherence to the mutuality rule
can result in waste and inequity, complete abolition of mutuality could
create hardships. 5 The California court recognized this and resisted the
temptation to replace fairness through mere mutuality with fairness and
efficiency through blind application of the Bernhard three-prong test."
41. 19 Cal. 2d at 808, 122 P.2d at 895.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). Numerous other courts have followed the Bernhard doctrine. See
Oldham v. Pritchett, 599 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1979); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 532
F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1978); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1950); Nickerson
v. Pep Boys, 247 F. Supp. 221 (D. Del. 1965); Eisel v. Columbia Packing Co., 181 F. Supp.
298 (D. Mass. 1960); Woodcock v. Udell, 48 Del. 69, 97 A.2d 878 (1953); Ellis v. Crockett,
451 P.2d 814 (Hawaii 1969); Pat Perusse Realty Co. v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 238 A.2d 100
(1968); De Polo v. Greig, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441 (1954); Gammel v. Ernst & Ernst,
245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364 (1955); Sanderson v. Balfour, 247 A.2d 185 (N.H. 1968);
Helmig v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 389 Pa. 21, 131 A.2d 622 (1957).
45. Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 88,
93 (3d Cir. 1969).
46. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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Thus, in Taylor v. Hawkinson47 the California court denied the applica-
tion of, collateral estoppel to the plaintiff not because it did not meet the
three-prong test, but because its application would result in unfairness to
the defendant due to the effect of a compromise verdict.48
The rejection of the mutuality rule is based on a desire to achieve fair-
ness with regard to the practical realities of the parties. 9 Collateral estop-
pel has been described as "a device to prevent relitigation of issues which
have been fairly decided, where the parties are not the same but the cir-
cumstances are such that no significant harm results from its
invocation." 50
The defensive use of collateral estoppel does not lead to an automatic
summary judgment for a client. On the contrary, the court will examine
each claim to determine whether it would be fair to apply collateral es-
toppel defensively without the mutuality requirement.
For example, in the case of Pennington v. Snow,51 the Alaska Supreme
Court adhered to the principle that mutuality will not necessarily be re-
quired as a rule. Yet, it denied the defensive use of collateral estoppel
because the particular circumstances of the prior adjudication made it
unfair to give the first judgment conclusive force.5"
Thus, where courts adopt the nonmutuality rule, there are a number of
factors which are taken into consideration in determining whether, under
the facts of a particular case, collateral estoppel should be applied. Some
of the most important factors are the following:
1. whether estoppel is asserted offensively or defensively;"3
2. whether there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the relevant issue
in the prior case;"
3. whether it would be generally unfair in the second case to use the result
of the first case;55
47. 47 Cal. 2d 893, 306 P.2d 797 (1957).
48. The fairness limitation was also applied in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins.
Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 966 (1963)
(in a civil case, collateral estoppel applied to issues previously determined in a criminal
proceeding).
49. 411 F.2d at 93.
50. Id. at 95.
51. 471 P.2d 370 (Alaska 1970).
52. Id. at 377.
53. "[T]he courts are more inclined to permit use of the [Bernhard] doctrine as a 'shield'
by one not a party to the first action, but not as a 'sword."' Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482,
483, 449 P.2d 536, 540 (1969).
54. See, e.g., Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d at -, 25 Cal. Rptr.
at 561, 375 P.2d at 441 (1962).
55. See Thomas v. Consolidation Coal Co., 380 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1967); Berner v. British
Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983
(1966); Albernaz v. Fall River, 346 Mass. 336, 191 N.E.2d 771 (1963).
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4. whether anomalous results would follow by the assertion of collateral es-
toppel by a stranger to the judgment;"
5. whether the first case was litigated with vigor;57
6. whether there was incentive to litigate the first case fully due to the
amount in controversy;" and
7. whether the subsequent use of the judgment in future litigation was for-
seeable during the first litigation. 9
The demise of mutuality has been hailed as "a shining landmark of
progress in justice and law administration .... No legal principle, per-
haps least of all the principle of collateral estoppel, should ever be ap-
plied to work injustice." 60 Fairness is the unifying thread between the
original rule of mutuality and the application of the Bernhard doctrine
today. It binds the divergent results of the cases which invoke it. Mutual-
ity was abandoned, to be replaced by the three questions articulated in
the Bernhard opinion.61 Yet even when these questions are answered in
the affirmative, courts will not always apply collateral estoppel. Through
close examination of all factors and by careful application of the spirit of
the Bernhard decision, two policy elements have become paramount.
First, there must be no unfairness in holding a party bound by an adverse
adjudication reached after a fully contested trial; a party is limited to one
day in court.6 2 Second, there must have been a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the issue.63
2. The Case Against the Defensive Use
The nonmutuality rule was not unanimously adopted. Because of the
inconsistencies that arose from its case by case application, notions of
fairness became difficult to define." In the case of Spettigue v. Maho-
ney6" the court considered the application of defensive collateral estoppel
in a case in which there was no unfairness since the party had had a prior
full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. The court recognized that it
is in the best public interest to preserve finality of litigation. However,
the court poignantly observed a more basic reality of our adversary judi-
cial system.
56. See Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 956 (2d Cir. 1964).
57. Id.
58. See Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74, 79-80 (6th Cir. 1968); Pennington v. Snow, 471
P.2d 370, 378 (Alaska 1970).
59. See 327 F.2d at 956; 346 F.2d at 540-41.
60. Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 37 (1965) [herein-
after cited as Currie, Civil Procedure].
61. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
62. Currie, Mutuality, supra note 26, at 315.
63. Id.
64. See generally Moore & Currier, supra note 15.
65. 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557 (1968).
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It is the adversary system that we have espoused in our system of justice.
The adversary system prevails in many aspects of the life of man but con-
test rules seldom provide that one contestant must be declared the loser to
a competitor whom he has never met....
[T]rial processes [do not] unerringly discover Truth. The selection of the
judge and jury, the choice of counsel, the availability of witnesses, the man-
ner of presentation of their testimony.., are affected by fortuitous circum-
stances and variously determine the outcome of a contest.6
The Spettigue court rejected the notion that any weakness of the Bern-
hard doctrine would be cured by never applying it "to work injustice."6 7
The court remarked:
[T]his panacea is the antithesis of our system of justice .... Concepts of
"justice" vary from man to man and from time to time and we can conceive
of no more pernicious an evil than fo an appellate court to lay down law in
high-sounding language but in such broad terms that its application to the
particular case cannot be determined with any degree of certainty until the
highest court in the particular judicial heirarchy has made its august pro-
nouncement as to what is "justice."66
For eloquent and broad sweeping reasons, many courts continue to ad-
here to the mutuality requirement.69
3. Defensive Use and the Goal of Judicial Economy
Nonmutuality in the defensive use of collateral estoppel promotes its
underlying policy of judicial economy in two ways. First, it encourages
parties to consolidate their claims in the initial litigation to the greatest
extent possible.7 0 Secondly, it indirectly has a pervasive tendency to avoid
66. Id. at 283, 445 P.2d at 562.
67. Currie, Civil Procedure, supra note 60, at 37.
68. 8 Ariz. App. at 284, 445 P.2d at 564. See also Note, A Probabilistic Analysis of the
Doctrine of Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel, 76 MICH. L. Rav. 612, 679 (1978). The au-
thors conclude that the abandonment of mutuality harms the system of civil sanctions by
weakening the impact of the burden of persuasion on trial outcome. Consequently, mutual-
ity should be retained in order to preserve the delicate balance in our judicial system.
69. See Clyde v. Hodge, 413 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1969); Suggs v. Alabama Power Co., 271 Ala
168, 123 So. 2d 4 (1960); Hogan v. Bright, 214 Ark. 691, 218 S.W.2d 80 (1949); Hill v. Colo-
nial Enterprises, Inc., 219 So. 2d 51 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan.
482, 449 P.2d 536 (1969); Stillpass v. Kenton Co. Airport Bd., Inc., 403 S.W.2d 46 (Ky.
1966); Pace v. Barrett, 205 So. 2d 647, (Miss. 1968); Kaylor v. Gallimore, 269 N.C. 405, 152
S.E.2d 518 (1967); Shaw v. Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 138 S.E.2d 520 (1964); Booth v. Kirk, 53
Tenn. App. 139, 381 S.W.2d 312 (1963); Swilley v. McCain, 374 S.W.2d 871 (Tex. 1964); Raz
v. Mills, 233 Or. 452, 378 P.2d 959 (1963). In Louisiana, adherence to the rule of mutuality is
dictated by the Civil Code as exemplified in Cauefield. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876
(5th Cir. 1967) and Lafayette Mem. Park, Inc. v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 191 So. 2d 318
(La. App. 1966). Commentators and scholars also urge the retention of the requirement of
mutuality. See, e.g., Note, Nonmutuality: Taking the Fairness Out of Collateral Estoppel,
13 IND. L. R.v. 563 (1980); Note, supra note 68; Moore & Currier, supra note 15.
70. Note, The Impacts of Defensive and Offensive Assertion of Collateral Estoppel by a
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the subsequent litigation altogether, which further supports the underly-
ing policy of collateral estoppel to minimize unnecessary litigation.1
On the other hand, nonmutuality in defensive collateral estoppel may
increase litigation in two ways. First, it gives the parties an incentive to
litigate their claims more fully in the original suit.7 2 For example, a small
liability settlement which would have previously satisfied both parties
will be litigated to its fullest extent, "contrary to the public interest in
minimizing litigation. '7 3 Secondly, it creates new issues in the second suit
concerning the question of whether collateral estoppel will be applied by
the court against the present adversary.1 4 Consequently, any argument for
the defensive use of collateral estoppel must include not only a discussion
of the fairness of its application, but also a discussion of how its applica-
tion will produce judicial economy.
E. Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel After Bernhard
1. Offensive Use of Collateral Estoppel
The doctrine of mutuality has been eroded considerably in the defen-
sive use of collateral estoppel, 5 namely, where a defendant who is a
stranger to the prior judgment asserts the prior judgment as a defense
against the plaintiff who was a party to the first suit.7 6 A different and
more difficult question arises where the stranger in the second suit is the
plaintiff who seeks to assert collateral estoppel against the defendant who
is bound by the prior judgment." To illustrate, A sues B, and B loses. B
now is bound by that judgment. Offensively, C can now seize the opportu-
nity to sue B and prevent him from relitigating an issue decided in the
prior suit. Thus, B is foreclosed from a defense which he never invoked
against C.
The common denominator of the defensive and offensive uses of collat-
eral estoppel in terms of judicial economy is that the estopped claimant
was a prior litigant, whether plaintiff or defendant.7 8 However, the appli-
cation of non-mutuality to the offensive use of collateral estoppel has
been not only more controversial, but also more cautiously examined by
Nonparty, 35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1010, 1024-25 (1967). The note also details the impacts of
modem procedures for compulsory and permissive joinders and counterclaims, which are
beyond the scope of this article.
71. Id. at 1032.
72. Note, Nonmutuality: Taking the Fairness Out of Collateral Estoppel, 13 IND. L. REV.
563, 572 (1980).
73. Moore & Currier, supra note 15, at 309-10.
74. Id.
75. See text accompanying note 44 supra.
76. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
77. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
78. Note, supra note 70, at 1030.
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courts and commentators.79 The reason is that in terms of judicial econ-
omy, defensive use tends to promote the underlying policy 0 whereas of-
fensive use may undermine it.
The offensive use of collateral estoppel has been criticized by many
courts because it operates contrary to the policies of efficiency and fair-
ness advocated by the spirit of the Bernhard doctrine. The offensive use
of collateral estoppel can increase litigation in three ways. First, it in-
creases litigation in the original suit. Just as in the defensive use, the
party must vigorously litigate since he may later be precluded from reliti-
gating.8' The offensive use of collateral estoppel is inherently unfair to a
defendant who must defend each case not knowing what additional plain-
tiffs or liability may be thrust upon him later on the basis of an unfavora-
ble judgment in the first suit.8 2 Offensive use of collateral estoppel may
also increase litigation in the second action because the issue of whether a
full and fair opportunity was available in the first suit will be litigated
rather than the issues themselves."s Finally, offensive use of collateral es-
toppel increases the number of subsequent suits because "plaintiffs are
not motivated to join in the first action."'" That is, litigation may actually
increase as plaintiffs wait in the wings to see the outcome of the first case
rather than joining where they could.8 5 For example, plaintiffs who may
intervene in the initial action become reluctant to do so as long as they
enjoy the possibility of relying upon a predecessor's favorable judgment.
If another party wins a judgment against the defendant, the waiting
plaintiff acquires a favorable judgment with which to estop the defendant
on identical issues. Conversely, if the defendant wins in a prior suit, the
plaintiff who waits has lost nothing. The defendant may not use the judg-
ment against the plaintiff because the plaintiff was not a party to the
original suit.8s
As a result, many courts refuse to allow the offensive use of collateral
estoppel by a plaintiff in the absence of mutuality.8 7 In addition, courts
allowing the defensive use of collateral estoppel by a stranger, have indi-
79. See text accompanying notes 80-89 infra.
80. See text accompanying notes 70-74 supra.
81. Note, supra note 72, at 573.
82. See, e.g., Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532, 540-41
(2d Cir. 1965); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958). See also Currie, Mutuality, supra note 25, at 287.
83. Note, supra note 72, at 573.
84. Id. at 575.
85. Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, -, 213 A.2d 26, 32 (1965).
86. Note, supra note 72, at 575.
87. See e.g., Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968); Berner v. British Common-
wealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965); McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified
School Dist., 212 Cal. App. 2d 422, 28 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1963); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal.
App. 2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958); Albernaz v. Fall River, 346 Mass. 336, 191
N.E.2d 771 (1963); Reardon v. Allen, 88 N.J. Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (1965).
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cated that offensive use would be disallowed absent mutuality.8
2. The Case for Offensive Use
The offensive use of collateral estoppel was defended by some as early
as 1926,s1 and criticized by others because of its potential to "unduly op-
press" the defendant. Oppression can result where multiple plaintiffs
watch, without risk while the defendant vigorously defends each and
every claim, hoping for an adverse finding that can be asserted against
the defendant in their own suits.90
However, in spite of the criticism, the offensive use of collateral estop-
pel without mutuality was allowed in the leading case of B. R. De Witt,
Inc. v. Hall."1 In strong language the court held the rule of mutuality a
"dead letter" and "inoperative" in the case.2 Over a strong dissent em-
phasizing unfairness to the defendant, the court pointed out in the in-
stant case that the issues were identical to the first proceeding; that the
defendant in the instant case-who was also the defendant in the first
case-offered no reason for not being held to the determination (of negli-
gence) in the first action; and that it was unquestioned that the first ac-
tion was defended with full vigor and opportunity to be heard. Conse-
quently, there was no reason either of policy or precedent to apply the
mutuality rule.93 A number of courts contemporaneous with De Witt also
permitted the use of collateral estoppel offensively in the absence of
mutuality.94
88. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934); Home Own-
ers Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 238 N.E.2d 55 (Mass.
1968).
89. See Comment, Privity and Mutuality in the Doctrine of Res Judicata, 35 YALE L.J.
607 (1926).
90. Currie, Mutuality, supra note 26, at 287.
91. 19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967). See King, Collateral Estop-
pel and Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation in New York, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1967);
Note, Collateral Estoppel. The Demise of Mutuality, 52A CORNELL L.Q. 724 (1967); Recent
Cases, Civil Procedure - Abandonment of the Mutuality Requirement, 22 ARK. L. REv.
491 (1968); Case Comment, Res Judicata - Mutuality of Estoppel Rule Abandonned in
New York, 47 BOSTON U.L. REv. 636 (1967); Case Comment, Estoppel: Affirmative Use of a
Judgment by a Nonparty, 52 MNN. L. REv. 768 (1968); Case Note, Collateral Estoppel -
The Doctrine of Mutuality: A Dead Letter, 47 Nan. L. REv. 640 (1968).
92. 19 N.Y.2d at -, 225 N.E.2d at 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601.
93. Id. at -, 225 N.E.2d at 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d at 601-02.
94. Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970); Provident Tradesmen's Bank & Trust Co.
v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969); Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., Compania
Mexicana de Seguros Generales v. Jernigan, 410 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v.
Webber, 396 F.2d 381 (3d Cir 1968); Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964);
Maryland ex rel. Gliedman v. Capital Airlines, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 298 (D. Md. 1967); United
States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), af/'d as to this
ground sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dis-
missed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Gorski v. Commercial Ins. Co., 206 F. Supp. 11'(E.D. Wisc.
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3. The Multiple Plaintiff Problem
Of special concern has been the offensive use of collateral estoppel
where there is the potential for multiple plaintiffs.9 The multiple plain-
tiff problem can be exemplified in a "mass tort" situation. In a well-
known hypothetical96 there was a train wreck where fifty passengers were
injured, allegedly as a result of the railroad's negligence. Twenty-five pas-
sengers sued separately and all failed to establish negligence on the part
of the railroad. Then passenger number twenty-six won his action. "Are
we to understand that the remaining twenty-four passengers can plead
the judgment in the case of No. 26 as conclusively establishing that the
railroad was guilty of negligence, while the railroad can make no reference
to the first twenty-five cases which it won?"91
Professor Currie termed such results an "aberration,"' 8 and warned
that "courts must be alert to the danger that [the extention of nonmutu-
ality to offensive collateral estoppel] by merely logical processes of ma-
nipulation may produce results which are abhorrent to the sense of jus-
tice and to orderly law administration."'99 As a rule of thumb, he proposed
that the aberration would be avoided if such collateral estoppel were al-
lowed only against a party who was a plaintiff in the prior suit.100
Subsequently, courts faced with offensive use of collateral estoppel
against a party who had been defendant in the prior suit shunned Profes-
sor Currie's rule of thumb. Instead, they proceeded to examine the partic-
ular facts on a case-by-case basis to determine if it was fair to apply col-
lateral estoppel offensively by a new plaintiff against a prior defendant. 01
4. Case-by-Case Approach
An examination of the facts in each particular case in order to deter-
mine if offensive use of collateral estoppel would be allowed has resulted
in a case-by-case approach to the application of collateral estoppel. For
example, in Zdanok v. Glidden Company,'02 offensive use of collateral es-
toppel was applied after careful review of the particular facts. The court
1962); O'Connor v. O'Leary, 247 Cal. App. 2d 646, 56 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1967); Perkins v. Benguet
Consol. Min. Co., 55 Cal. App. 2d 720, 132 P.2d 70 (1942); Desmond v. Kramer, 96 N.J.
Super. 96, 232 A.2d 470 (1967); McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1956).
95. See text accompanying notes 82-86 supra; Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322 (1979).
96. Currie, Mutuality, supra note 26, at 285-86.
97. Id. at 286.
98. Id. at 289.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 309.
101. Nevertheless, Professor Currie later applauded the particularized approach because
the courts had the courage to reject "the easy course of generalization as a substitute for the
ideal of justice in the individual case." Currie, Civil Procedure, supra note 60, at 29.
102. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
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found no unfairness to the defendant because the first suit was prose-
cuted by Glidden with utmost vigor up to the Supreme Court of the
United States. The second action was "known to... be lurking in the
wings," and Glidden could not reasonably argue that it was unfairly
surprised.103
It is important to note that in allowing the defensive use of collateral
estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Illinois Founda-
tion'1" the Supreme Court also examined the variable of fairness in terms
of notice. The Court pointed out that Blonder-Tongue knew of its pend-
ing case on the validity of the same patent; therefore, it presumably was
prepared to litigate and litigate to the finish against the defendant there
involved.105 The Court found no unfairness in allowing the second defen-
dant to estop the plaintiff from reopening the issue of the validity of the
patent. The Court also cited the Zdanok case with approval as to the
method of measuring fairness, and foreshadowed that the same principle
might apply were the Court facing the offensive use of collateral
estoppel.10 6
The particularized approach was extended to the offensive use of col-
lateral estoppel in multiple-tort suits in United States v. United Air
Lines, Inc.10 7 The court examined the facts of the case and found no un-
fairness in allowing the offensive use of collateral estoppel because "the
rule of nonmutuality is not a general one but a limited one to be deter-
mined from the facts and circumstances in each case whether or not it
should be applied."108
However, particularized treatment does not always result in permitting
the offensive use of collateral estoppel. In Berner v. British Common-
wealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd.,10 9 the same court which allowed the offensive
use of collateral estoppel in the Zdanok and United States v. United Air-
lines held that its use would be unfair in the Berner case. After examin-
ing the facts, the court held that Berner lacked incentive to fully litigate
the first case due to the relatively small claim involved.11 °
In applying the case-by-case approach, courts have been concerned
with both the opportunity' and the incentive1 2 to litigate fully in the
103. Id. at 956.
104. 402 U.S. 330 (1971).
105. Id. at 332.
106. Id. at 330. The court later faced the question of the offensive use of collateral estop-
pel by a nonparty in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
107. 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), aff'd as to this ground sub nom. United
Air Lines, Inc. v. Weiner, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
108. 216 F. Supp. at 726.
109. 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
110. 346 F.2d at 540-41.
111. 327 F.2d 944.
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first action. Among the factors which have been material in such determi-
nations are: the size of the claim;1 ' the forum of the first litigation;" 4 the
use of initiative;" 5 the extent of the litigation;" 6 the competence and ex-
perience of counsel;117 indications of compromise verdicts;" 8 the foresee-
ability of future litigation;" 9 and whether the prior judgment is final. 20
As a result of the many factors which courts consider in order to deter-
mine whether the offensive use of collateral estoppel is applicable to the
particular case, it is not surprising that the results are inconsistent. For
example, in Reardon v. Allen,' 21 the New Jersey court denied collateral
estoppel after it examined the conditions of the first trial and determined
that it would be unfair to allow the offensive use of collateral estoppel
under the facts. Two years later in Desmond v. Kramer, 2' after examin-
ing the factors which showed that the first trial constituted a full and fair
opportunity for the defendant to litigate, the same court allowed the of-
fensive use of collateral estoppel. What emerges from these apparent con-
tradictions is a common thread of fairness in the application of offensive
collateral estoppel. Furthermore, fairness is evaluated in terms of the
above mentioned factors"23 in light of the facts of the particular case.
There is danger in restricting a plea of collateral estoppel to a "prece-
dent" of nomutuality in the jurisdiction. The following is a poignant ex-
ample of what may be encountered when relying too heavily on law which
is in the process of being developed on a case-by-case basis. In Di Orio v.
Scottsdale,'24 the court held that mutuality was not required as a prereq-
uisite to applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel and allowed the of-
fensive use without mutuality. The court recognized the result obtained
under the established exceptions to the mutuality rule, but rested its de-
cision squarely on the elements and principles of the use of offensive col-
lateral estoppel without mutuality.
It is generally accepted that a party who has had one full and fair opportu-
nity to prove a claim in a court of competent jurisdiction and has failed to
do so, should not be permitted to go to trial on the merits of that claim a
second time. Both orderliness and reasonable time saving of judicial admin-
112. 346 F.2d 532.
113. Id.
114. Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A. 260 (1934).
115. 327 F.2d 944.
116. 216 F. Supp. 709.
117. Graves v. Associated Transport, Inc., 344 F.2d 894 (1965).
118. 47 Cal. 2d 893, 306 P.2d 797.
119. 327 F.2d 944.
120. 216 F. Supp. 709.
121. 88 N.J. Super. 560, 213 A.2d 26 (1965).
122. 96 N.J. Super. 96, 232 A.2d 470 (1967).
1213. See text accompanying notes 111-20.
124. 2 Ariz. App. 329, 408 P.2d 849 (1965).
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istration require that this be so unless there is some overriding considera-
tion of fairness to a litigant, which the circumstances of a particular case
dictate. The finding of Di Orio's negligence in the district court came after a
full opportunity on the part of Di Orio to show the very matter which he
now urges .... We find no unfairness in applying the doctrine of collateral
estoppel as a bar to Di Orio's action against the City of Scottsdale .25
Three years later the court was faced with a similar fact situation in
Spettigue v. Mahoney. 28 Yet, the court here held that mutuality was
required for the offensive use of collateral estoppel.
In reality, the rule proved illusive, but the search for fairness in each
case was at the center of each decision. The practitioner must be pre-
pared to argue the facts as a basis for fairness in the application of collat-
eral estoppel as an offensive tool. Over-reliance on the law of mutuality
can be fatal since courts approach each case individually.
F. Emergence of the Fairness Requirement
The rigidity of the original application of mutuality was based on a
principle of fairness: in order to use a judgment the party must also be
bound by it. 12 7 In abandoning the rule of mutuality, courts recognized
that hardship can flow from the complete abolition of mutuality, as well
as from rigid adherence to it.128 Therefore, the propriety of using collat-
eral estoppel in cases of nonmutuality should be determined by the facts
in each case.12 9 A growing number of courts are in agreement with the
opinion in Rachal v. Hill in which the court said:
While the requirements of mutuality need no longer be met, the doctrine of
collateral estoppel will not be applied unless it appears that the party
against whom the estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate the issue in the prior proceeding and that application of the doctrine
will not result in an injustice to the party against whom it is asserted under
the particular circumstances of the case.130
Indeed, this sentiment is particularized in Parklane Hosiery Co. v.
Shore.183 Although the many authorities already cited indicate a gradual
erosion of the mutuality requirement, Parklane was instrumental in facil-
itating the demise of the rule of mutuality and the adherence to the prin-
ciple of fairness. A close analysis of the Court's reasoning is therefore ap-
125. Id. at _, 408 P.2d at 852.
126. 8 Ariz. App. 281, 445 P.2d 557 (1968). See also text accompanying notes 64-68.
127. 1B J. MOoRE, supra note 2, 0 .412[1] at 1801.
128. 411 F.2d at 88.
129. 216 F. Supp. 709.
130. 435 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971). The fairness re-
quirement is extensively treated in the Rachal case. See also text accompanying notes 53-59
and 111-20 supra.
131. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
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propriate and necessary.
III. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore
A. The Jury Trial Question: Controversy in the Federal Courts
The Supreme Court's Parklane decision resolved an inter-circuit con-
flict between the Fifth and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding
the seventh amendment right to a jury trial.13 2 The facts of the cases
before both circuits were essentially the same. In a federal district court
action tried without a jury, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
obtained an equitable judgment against defendants s' 3 who were found
guilty of violation of certain securities tax laws. In a subsequent private
suit for damages, plaintiffs who were not party to the first suit moved for
partial summary judgment. They contended that the defendants should
be estopped from relitigating the same issues decided against the defen-
dants in the SEC suit. Arguing that collateral estoppel would deprive
them of their seventh amendment right to jury trial, the defendants op-
posed the motion. In Rachal v. Hill, the Fifth Circuit declined to apply
collateral estoppel because of the possible deprivation of right to jury
trial."" However, the Second Circuit, in finding that the deprivation was
constitutionally permissible, held that the defendants in Shore v. Park-
lane Hosiery Co. were not entitled to relitigate the issues."s5 Both courts
based their reasoning on Beacon Theatres v. Westover."'
132. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977); Rachal v. Hill, 435 F.2d
59 (5th Cir. 1970).
133. In Rachal, the SEC, prior to the filing of the second suit, obtained a permanent
injunction against Rachal for violation of §§ 5 and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e and 77q(a) (1970); § 10b of the Securities Exchange Act (SEA) of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970); and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 10b-5 (1971). In a private
action, Hill sued as representative of the stockholders and derivatively in behalf of two cor-
porations to recover damages. Plaintiff charged Rachal with violation of 10(b) of SEA of
1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 10b-5, promulgated thereunder, and § 5
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
In Shore v. Parklane, the SEC obtained a declaratory judgment that defendants had vio-
lated § 14(a) of the SEA of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Plaintiff's class action suit was to
recover damages for violation of §§ 10(b), 13(a), 14(a) and 20(a) of the SEA of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78j(b); 78m(a) and 78n(a) and rules promulgated thereunder. Securities and Ex-
change Comm. v. Parklane Hosiery, 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Essentially, the de-
fendants were found guilty of issuing a false and misleading proxy statement. The plaintiff
asked that the defendants not be permitted to relitigate the question decided earlier. Actu-
ally, the complaint in the private suit was filed before the SEC action. Defendants did not
request a jury trial until after the resolution of the equitable suit. The Shore court noted
that Parklane had made no effort to protect its right to jury trial which the court suggested
they might have done by trying to conclude the private suit before completion of the SEC
action or by requesting an advisory jury in the SEC action. 565 F.2d at 821-22.
134. 435 F.2d at 64.
135. 565 F.2d at 821.
136. 359 U.S. 500 (1959). In Beacon, the plaintiff, under threat of suit for violation of
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1. The Rule of the Fifth Circuit: Rachal v. Hill
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the erosion of the mutuality require-
ment but expressed doubt about the appropriateness of using collateral
estoppel in Rachal.137 Ultimately it based its refusal to grant collateral
estoppel on the great respect that Beacon and its progeny had engen-
dered for the right to jury trial.13 8 The court pointed out that denial of
the right to the second suit would place plaintiff in a position superior to
that to which he would have been entitled had he been a party to the
prior action because then defendants would have been entitled to a jury
trial on the issue of liability. 39 The court did not state that its decision
was constitutionally mandated.
Critics of Rachal have noted that Beacon, purportedly Rachal's major
support, involved the resolution of legal and equitable claims within the
same suit. 40 Simply by ordering that the legal claim be tried first, the
Supreme Court in Beacon could preserve both the jury trial and the judi-
cial economy of collateral estoppel. Yet, in Rachal, one had to give way to
the other. Since the Beacon situation was inapposite to Rachal it was not
a proper source of guidance.' 4 ' By basing its holding on a policy favoring
jury trial rather than on the mandate of the Constitution, the Rachal
court avoided seventh amendment analysis. But the court did acknowl-
edge that had the successive suits involved the same litigants, collateral
estoppel would have applied."42 This acknowledgement implies that the
court made the right to jury trial turn on the presence of mutuality. Crit-
ics have called the distinction logically unsound 143 and they have inferred
that, although the Rachal court made no overt seventh amendment anal-
ysis, the decision is rooted in a literal interpretation of the seventh
antitrust laws, sought: 1) a declaratory judgment that his contract was not in violation of
the antitrust laws; and 2) a judgment enjoining the defendant from suing him for antitrust
law violations. The defendant's counterclaim, alleging those violations, was for treble dam-
ages; he requested a jury trial. The trial court ruled that it would first decide the equitable
issues without a jury. Since the equitable and the legal claims shared common factual issues
any prior equitable adjudication would have precluded relitigation of those issues before the
jury. The Supreme Court overruled both lower courts, holding that when legal and equitable
claims in one suit share common factual issues, the trial court may not, except under very
compelling circumstances, order a sequence of trials that prevents determination of the legal
issues by a jury. Id. at 510-11.
137. 435 F.2d at 63.
138. Id. at 64. See note 136 supra.
139. 435 F.2d at 64.
140. Comment, Use of Government Judgments in Private Antitrust Litigation: Clayton
Act Sec. 5(a); Collateral Estoppel & Jury Trial, 43 U. Cm, L. REv. 338, 370 (1976).
141. Id. at 370; Shapiro & Coquillette, The Fetish of Jury Trials in Civil Cases: A Com-
ment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARv. L. RE V. 442, 455 (1971).
142. 435 F.2d at 63 n.5.
143. Shapiro & Colquillette, supra note 141, at 455.
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amendment.""' Herein lies the Second Circuit's criticism of Rachal."45
2. The Rule of the Second Circuit: Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.
Four years after Rachal, when the Second Circuit was presented with
essentially the same question, it gave collateral estoppel effect to the
prior equitable determination.1 4 It held that the seventh amendment ap-
plies only where disputed issues of fact exist. 747 Inasmuch as the prior
litigation had resolved the factual issues, the court reasoned that "noth-
ing remains for trial either with or without a jury." 48 Moreover, the Sec-
ond Circuit claimed that Rachal relied incorrectly on Beacon for two rea-
sons. First, Beacon involved only the question of order of trial within one
suit."49 Second, Beacon's implicit assumption is that collateral estoppel
would apply to deprive a party of a jury trial once there had been a prior
equitable adjudication. 5 Were it not for such a preclusive effect, the
Beacon Court would have been indifferent to the order.'5 ' Finally, the
court denied the defendants' claim that the seventh amendment required
that they be allowed a jury trial.152 Defendants had reasoned that since in
1791 collateral estoppel would not have been applied in the absence of
mutuality to deprive them of a jury trial, it should not be applied against
them now.53 Labelling the defendants' approach to seventh amendment
analysis strictly historical,'5 the court noted the petrifying effect such an
analysis would have on procedural development. 5 5 The court cited Ross
v. Bernhard56 for the proposition that the strict historical approach had
lost favor with the Court.' 57 Moreover, even under the strict historical
mode of analysis, the court held, there would be no right to jury trial in
the present suit because in 1791 there was no legal analogue of an SEC
144. Id.
145. 565 F.2d at 820. Cf. Note, Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.: The Seventh Amendment
and Collateral Estoppel, 66 CAriF. L. REv. 862, 868 (1978) (mutuality not hypertechnical
procedural rule as Second Circuit claimed).
146. 565 F.2d at 821.
147. Id. at 819.
148. Id.
149. 565 F.2d at 820. See note 136 supra.
150. 565 F.2d at 820.
151. Id. at 821.
152. Id. The Second Circuit relied on Beacon's "inherent respect" for collateral estoppel.
Id. Also, the court noted that permitting relitigation would violate principles of "fairness,
finality, certainty, economy in utilization of judicial resources, avoidance of possibly incon-
sistent results and achievement of the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action." Id.
153. Id. at 822.
154. Id. See notes 225-30 infra and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. 396 U.S. 531 (1970) (application of the historical test fraught with difficulty). See
notes 268-71 infra and accompanying text.
157. 565 F.2d at 823.
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proceeding for injunctive relief or of a "stockholder's suit based on an
implied right of action created by antifraud provisions of federal securi-
ties laws."'' 58
B. The Supreme Court's Resolution of the Circuit Court Conflict
1. The Facts of Parkiane
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore presented "the question [of] whether a
party who has had issues of fact adjudicated adversely to it in an equita-
ble action may be collaterally estopped from relitigating the same issue
before a jury in a subsequent legal action brought against it by a new
party." " 9 Leo M. Shore, a minority shareholder, brought a class action in
federal district court against Parklane Hosiery Co. and twelve of its of-
ficers, directors, and stockholders'6 0 charging violation of sections
10(b),' 6 ' 14(a),' 62 and 20(a)' 6 ' of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 "as
well as various rules and regulations promulgated by the Securities Ex-
change Commission."'6 4 Shore alleged that Parkiane and several of its of-
ficers, directors, and stockholders had issued a false and misleading proxy
statement relating to a merger. The complaint asked for damages, recis-
sion of the merger, and recovery of costs. 6 5 Shortly thereafter, and prior
to the trial of the Shore case, the SEC brought an action to enjoin the
merger, alleging essentially the same violations concerning the proxy
statement. 6
In the SEC action, the district court rendered a declaratory judgment
against Parklane, finding the proxy statement to be materially false and
misleading. 67 The Second Circuit affirmed. 6 8 Shore subsequently moved
for partial summary judgment,269 seeking to collaterally estop Parklane
158. Id. But see, Comment, Right to Jury Trial and Collateral Estoppel in Securities
Litigation, 42 ALB. L. REv. 733, 738 (1978); Note, Nonmutual Collateral Estoppel and the
Seventh Amendment Jury Trial Right, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 75, 91 (1978).
159. Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co., Civ. No. 74-4986 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd and re-
manded, 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977), af'd, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
160. Id.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
162. Id. at § 78n(a).
163. Id. at § 78t(a).
164. 439 U.S. at 324.
165. Id. at 325.
166. Id. See also SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1085 (2d Cir. 1977). The
SEC alleged violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(a),
78n(a) (1976) (former version codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 10(b), 13(a), 14(a) and violations of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976), as well as rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder.
167. SEC v. Parklane Hosiery Co., 422 F. Supp. 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
168. 558 F.2d 1083.
169. 439 U.S. at 325. Only partial summary judgment was sought. In an action to recover
under the proxy rules, a plaintiff is not entitled to relief merely by proving that the proxy
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from relitigating the proxy issue. The district court denied the motion on
the implicit ground that an application of collateral estoppel in such a
case would deny Parklane its seventh amendment right to a jury trial.17 0
In an interlocutory appeal the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed. 171
As noted above, the Second Circuit was not the first court to address
the issue of the use of collateral estoppel and the right to a jury trial. In a
similar case, Rachal v. Hill,'7 2 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
had taken a position contrary to that of the Second Circuit. The Fifth
Circuit expressed little concern for the concept of nonmutual collateral
estoppel.173 The main thrust of its opinion concerned the loss of the right
to a jury trial through a prior decision in a court of equity.'"
Because the position the Second Circuit had taken in the Shore case
was in conflict with the position taken by the Fifth Circuit, the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari.'7 5 The Court had already re-
jected mutuality in defensive collateral estoppel in Blonder-Tongue Lab-
oratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation.17  The Supreme
Court completed its repudiation of the blanket requirement of mutuality
in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore.1 7
solicitation was materially false and misleading. He must also show that he was injured and
that he sustained damages. See id. at 325 n.2 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396
U.S. 375, 386-90 (1970)).
170. The grounds for denying the motion must be inferred. 565 F.2d at 818.
171. Id.
172. 435 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971). See text accompanying
notes 137-45 supra.
173. The opinion noted:
[Although] many states still honor the rule of mutuality of estoppel, the modem
trend has been to discard the rule and preclude a party from relitigating an issue
decided against him in a prior action, even if the party asserting the estoppel was a
stranger to the prior action .... Thus it is clear that the requirements of mutuality
need not be met for collateral estoppel to be applied in an action presenting a federal
question in the courts of the United States.
435 F.2d at 61-62.
174. See text accompanying notes 137-45 supra.
175. 439 U.S. at 325 n.3.
176. 402 U.S. 313 (1971). See note 44 supra and accompanying text. Blonder-Tongue may
or may not have been limited to patent infringement cases. The Court in Blonder-Tongue
asked what the Court in Parklane had referred to as the "broader question": "whether it is
any longer tenable to afford a litigant more than one full and fair opportunity for judicial
resolution of the same issue." 402 U.S. at 328, cited in 439 U.S. at 328.
177. 439 U.S. at 331 & n.16. The Court notes that its approach is also the approach of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 2, Apr. 15, 1975) which states
that there is no intrinsic difference between defensive and offensive collateral estoppel, al-
though the latter requires a stronger showing of adequate prior opportunity to litigate.
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2. The Majority Opinion - The Demise of Mutuality
In Parklane the Court permitted the use of nonmutual offensive collat-
eral estoppel. 178 Following the decision in Bernhard, scholars had been
concerned about the potential for unfairness and abuse if nonmutuality
were extended to the application of offensive collateral estoppel. 19 Set-
ting a tone of conservatism and noting that others had advanced many
reasons why defensive and offensive collateral estoppel should be treated
differently, the Court cited several scholars who had "expressed reserva-
tions regarding the application of offengive collateral estoppel." 80 Justice
Stewart, delivering the majority opinion, noted that, unlike defensive col-
lateral estoppel, the application of offensive collateral estoppel by a plain-
tiff does not necessarily promote judicial economy. The potential for later
application of defensive collateral estoppel induces the plaintiff to consol-
idate defendants in the first action, if possible.'8 ' The reverse of this is
true in the use of offensive collateral estoppel. Nonmutual offensive use of
the plea, the Court noted, could encourage a plaintiff to "wait and see.'
8 2
The Court also noted that nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel has a
potential for unfairness. For instance, a defendant in the first action may
have had "little incentive to defend vigorously." 83 Similarly, the poten-
tial for unfairness is present when the judgment relied on may have been
inconsistent with earlier judgments on the same issues.'" Despite its cau-
tious tone, the Court "concluded that the preferable approach for dealing
with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use of
offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to
determine when it should be applied." 85 The Court then proceeded to
explain how it had applied this philosophy to the instant case.
In delineating how the circumstances in the case before it justified per-
178. See Currie, Mutuality, supra note 26, at 289-91. See also 439 U.S. at 326 n.4.
179. See Currie, Mutuality, supra note 26, at 285-87. Currie was especially concerned
with the potential for what he termed "the multiple claimant anomaly." Such an anomalous
decision would occur when one decision, adverse to the person against whom collateral es-
toppel would be asserted is inconsistent with previous decisions and the anomalous finding
is then perpetuated by the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel. Id. at 281, 285-86.
180. 439 U.S. at 329 n..
181. Id. at 329-30.
182. Id. at 330. See Currie, Mutulity, supra note 26. "Wait and see" and the multiple
claimant anomaly concept would go together. A plaintiff could wait for a favorable judgment
in a series, and, then, arguing that this was the reliable one, try to apply offensive collateral
estoppel. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2, April
15, 1975).
183. 439 U.S. at 330.
184. Id. at 331 n.14. It may be that, despite Professor Currie's concern, in nonmutual
collateral estoppel there lies a potenial to rectify an unfairness. If all the decisions on an
issue were based on the same law and facts, then one of the decisions must be unreliable. It
could be the first decision just as easily as the anomalous one.
185. 439 U.S. at 331.
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mitting the asymmetrical offensive application of collateral estoppel, the
Court noted that "the respondent probably could not have joined in the
injunctive action brought by the SEC even had he so desired."'8' Both
case precedent' 87 and statutory authority 8 supported the impermissibil-
ity of such consolidation. Similarly, the Court noted that there was "no
unfairness . . . in applying offensive collateral estopped in this case."'" 9
In light of the seriousness of the allegations in the complaint by the
SEC 90 and its awareness of the action brought by Shore, 91 the Court felt
that Parklane Hosiery Co. "had every incentive to litigate the SEC law-
suit fully and vigorously."' 19 This judgment also did not have the poten-
tial for unfairness which it would have had if it had been an anomaly
following a series of judgments. 9 3
In addition, the Court spoke of the potential for inequity when "the
186. Id. at 332.
187. Id. at 332 n.17 (citing SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 475 F.2d 1236, 1240 (1972)
(an appeal from a denial of a motion for intervention in an SEC action by victims of alleged
securities fraud was denied)).
The SEC's workload, despite its limited budget and staff, would be substantially
increased if such intervention were allowed. Additional issues would have to be tried
in the main action .... For example, a private party seeking damages would have to
prove scienter and causation, elements of proof not required in an SEC injunction
action .... Already complicated securities cases would become more confused and
complex. The SEC can bring the large number of enforcement actions it does only
because in all but a few cases consent decrees are entered. The intervention of a
private plaintiff might tend to discourage or at least to complicate efforts to obtain a
consent decree. We hold that the complicating effect of the additional issues and the
additional parties outweighs any advantage of a single disposition of the common
issues.
475 F.2d at 1240. Responding to appellant's reliance on Rachal and its argument that, be-
cause there could be no collateral estoppel effect from the equitable action in the private
legal action, consolidation should be permitted, Judge Timbers said: "Suffice it to say that
in our view it is preferable to require private parties to commence their own actions than to
have SEC actions bogged down through intervention." Id. at 1240 n.5.
188. "In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will
unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties." FED. R. Civ.
P. 24(b)(2). The court has broad discretion to determine whether to grant or deny permis-
sive intervention in cases involving multiple parties and claims. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78u(g)
which states in part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1407(a) of title 28, or any other provision
of law, no action for equitable relief instituted by the Commission pursuant to the
securities laws shall be consolidated or coordinated with other actions not brought by
the Commission, even though such other actions may involve common questions of
fact, unless such consolidation is consented to by the Commission.
189. 439 U.S. at 332.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 332 n.18.
192. Id. at 332.
193. "[T]he judgment in the SEC action was not inconsistent with any previous decision."
Id. Thus the case is not subject to Professor Currie's "multiple claimant anomaly." See
Currie, Mutuality, supra note 26.
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second action affords procedural opportunities unavailable in the first ac-
tion that could readily cause a different result."'" Nevertheless, the
Court felt that Parklane should be collaterally estopped from relitigating
the question of the material falsity of the proxy statement195 because the
factual issue had already been decided. Agreeing with the Second Circuit,
the Court ruled that the use of offensive collateral estoppel based on an
equitable judgment did not violate defendants' seventh amendment right
to a jury trial in a subsequent suit for damages.08 Of the arguments ad-
vanced by the Second Circuit, the Court incorporated the following: (1) in
1791 an equitablejudgment had estoppel effect in a court of law; 97 (2)
Beacon implied that collateral estoppel would prevent relitigation; 98 and
(3) no jury trial right exists where no disputed question of fact remains. 199
Additionally, the Court expressed the same displeasure with the strict
historical approach as did the Second Circuit.20 0 The Court did not, how-
ever maintain that the approach had lost favor but rather that it had
never been used.20l Moreover, the Court did not claim there was no com-
mon law analogue to the case at bar. Rather, the Court based its freedom
to deny a jury trial on logical grounds:
The petitioners [defendants] have advanced no persuasive reason why the
meaning of the Seventh Amendment should depend on whether or not mu-
tuality of parties is present. A litigant who has lost because of adverse fac-
tual findings in an equity action is equally deprived of a jury trial whether
he is estopped from relitigating the factual issues against the same party or
a new party.202
Quoting from Galloway v. United States, the Court explained that the
seventh amendment was designed to preserve the jury trial institution "in
only its most fundamental elements.
'20 3
Viewing both judges and juries as competent to decide issues of fact as
the rules of procedure in equity or in law required, the Court dismissed
194. Id. at 331. The Court noted that the defendant in the first action will typically not
have chosen the forum of that action. Hence, such a defendant, might have had "to defend
in an inconvenient forum and therefore was unable to engage in full scale discovery or call
witnesses." Id.
195. The implication was that the presence or absence of a jury as factfinder became a
"neutral" by its not having been required in the SEC action and by the conclusion that the
prior decision was reliable since no procedural opportunities had been denied the party be-
ing estopped.
196. 439 U.S. at 337.
197. Id. at 334.
198. Id. at 335.
199. Id. at 336-37.
200. Id. at 337. See notes 225-30 infra and accompanying text.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 335.
203. Id. at 337 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)).
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"the presence or absence of a jury as a fact finder. . . [as] . . . basically
neutral. '20 4 It saw the jury as fact finder "quite unlike, for example, the
necessity of defending the first lawsuit in an inconvenient forum."2 5 The
majority of eight justices concluded that Parklane Hosiery had had a "full
and fair opportunity" to litigate its claims in the SEC action.20 6
3. The Dissent
The majority opinion, however, was accompanied by a vigorous dissent
by Justice Rehnquist. Declining to comment on nonmutual collateral es-
toppel alone, 20 7 Justice Rehnquist focused his dissent on the deprivation
of Parklane's right to a jury trial in the legal action. While expressing
little sympathy for Parklane, he objected to the arbitrary rationale of the
majority opinion.20 8 Citing Blackstone's description of trial by jury as
"the glory of the English law, '209 he criticized the Court's reduction of the
right to a mere "neutral. '210 Urging that the Court should have taken a
narrow historical approach to the seventh amendment issue, he argued
that "any change in the province of the jury, no matter how drastic the
diminution of its functions can always be denominated 'procedural re-
form.' ",212 He agreed with the dissent in Galloway=2 in which "Mr. Jus-
204. 439 U.S. at 332 n.19.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 332-33.
Since the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial only with respect
to issues of fact, once those issues have been fully and fairly adjudicated in a prior
proceeding, nothing remains for trial, either with or without a jury. The party seeking
the retrial has already exercised his right to be heard on the issues and to cross-
examine witnesses with respect to them. The interests of finality, certainty and econ-
omy of judicial resources then come into play to preclude his relitigating the same
issue a second or third time . . . absent some showing of fundamental unfairness.
207. "Because I believe that the use of offensive collateral estoppel in this particular case
was improper it is not necessary for me to decide whether I would approve its use in circum-
stances where the defendant's right to a jury trial was not impaired." 439 U.S. at 339 n.1.
208. "[T]he nagging sense of unfairness as to the way petitioners have been treated, en-
gendered by the imprimatur placed by the Court of Appeals on respondent's 'heads I win,
tails you lose' theory of this litigation is not dispelled by the Court's antiseptic analysis of
the issues in the case." Id. at 338. Respondent Shore was not bound by the decision of the
SEC action, yet the decision could preclude the jury's deciding the issue of material falsity
of the proxy.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 332 n.19.
211. Id. at 346. Justice Rehnquist argued that mutuality or symmetry was required in
1791 and that to abrogate this requirement by denominating it a procedural charge and to
thus affect jury function was in contravention of the seventh amendment.
212. See id. at 337 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 392 (1943)). In Gal-
loway the Court had ratified the modern form of directed verdict even though the evidence
was sufficient that a jury would have decided the case at common law. Justice Black, dis-
senting, pointed out that the common law directed verdict required that there be no evi-
dence in favor of the non-moving party. 319 U.S. at 402 (Black, J., dissenting).
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tice Black lamented 'the gradual process of judicial erosion which in one
hundred fifty years has slowly worn away a major portion of the essential
guarantees of the Seventh Amendment."2 13 Justice Rehnquist lamented
the infringement on the guarantee in part because "juries represent the
layman's common sense. .. and thus keep the administration of law in
accord with the wishes and feelings of the community. ' 214
The lone dissenter stated additionally that, even if it were not violative
of the seventh amendment, the use of collateral estoppel in this case was
against the strong federal policy in support of trial by jury.21 5 Citing Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.2 16 which decided that the
strong federal policy in favor of juries required that they be part of diver-
sity actions in the federal courts,21 7 he stated that precedent indicated
that the outcome could be affected by whether a judge or jury decides the
issue.218 Noting what he perceived as an incongruity in the reasoning of
the majority, he pointed out that they accepted "the proposition that it is
unfair to apply offensive collateral estoppel 'where a second action affords
the defendant procedural opportunities unavailable in the first action
that could readily cause a different result."' 21 9 Yet the availability of dis-
covery, 'a device unmentioned in the Constitution," 220 was regarded as a
controlling factor in permitting the application of collateral estoppel and
"the presence or absence of a jury as factfinder [as] basically neutral. '221
Justice Rehnquist noted in expressing another concern based on federal
policy grounds that the Court would be giving administrative agencies
power beyond that which Congress had intended. Defendants, he argued,
would be coerced to agree to consent orders in order to preserve their
right to jury trial. He found a final irony in the fact that a jury would still
213. 439 U.S. at 339 (citing 319 U.S. at 397 (dissenting opinion)). Rehnquist further ar-
gued that, though in Galloway the Court "upheld the modern form of directed verdict
against a Seventh Amendment challenge... it is clear that a similar form of directed ver-
dict existed at common law in 1791." 439 U.S. at 349.
214. Id. at 344 (quoting 0. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 237 (1920)).
215. 439 U.S. at 351. Justice Rehnquist used Beacon Theatres to support his position, as
the majority had used it for theirs.
[T]he Court held that where both equitable and legal claims or defenses are
presented in a single case, 'only under the most imperative circumstances, circum-
stances which in view of the flexible procedures of the Federal Rules we cannot now
anticipate, can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determina-
tion of equitable claims.'
439 U.S. at 351 (quoting 359 U.S. at 510-11).
216. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
217. Id. at 537-39, cited in 439 U.S. at 352.
218. 439 U.S. at 355 (citing 415 U.S. at 198). Compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968) with RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88(2), Comment d (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1975).
219. 439 U.S. at 353 (quoting 435 F.2d at 331).
220. 439 U.S. at 354.
221. Id. at 354 (quoting 435 F.2d at 332 n.19).
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have to be impaneled in this case 222 and that the time that would be
saved in not relitigating the proxy issue would be slight, since much of
the time in jury trials is spent in jury selection, voir dire, and the
charges. 228
IV. Parklane: JUDICIAL REPEAL OF THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT?
Parklane demonstrates the seventh amendment dilemma. Fidelity to
the language of the amendment will freeze the offensive collateral estop-
pel doctrinal development which Parklane seeks to forward. The problem
arises when courts begin to question whether the framers of the seventh
amendment specifically intended to limit its development.
There is disagreement about the analytic approach that the Court
should use in seventh amendment cases. Since the amendment states that
the jury trial right is to be preserved, it has traditionally been considered
important that the constitutional adequacy of the present day right
should be determined by reference to the right as it existed in 1791, the
date of the amendment's adoption. This approach has been called the
historical one. With the possible exception of one footnote,2u the Court
has never explicitly abandoned the historical approach. But to the dismay
of several commentators, it has frequently sanctioned departure from
1791 practice. To justify its endorsement of the departures, the Court has
used three analytic approaches. The first two, the common law analogue
theory and the fundamental elements theory are purportedly grounded in
1791 practice. The third approach, which makes the present day ade-
quacy of a legal remedy the criterion for a right to jury trial, deviates
from the historical method. The Court has also hinted at a permissible
functional approach.
A. Strict Historical Approach
A very strict interpretation of the seventh amendment would require a
jury trial right for every situation in which this right existed at common
law.225 Even if this goal were desirable, there are numerous obstacles to
its achievement. Historical searches yield inconsistent and inconclusive
results because of gaps and inaccuracies in the records and because prac-
222. "[T]he Court will have simply added a powerful club to the administrative agencies'
arsenals that even Congress was unwilling to provide them." 439 U.S. at 355-56.
223. Id. at 355 n.24.
224. See notes 234 & 266 infra and accompanying text.
225. McCoid, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon Thea-
tres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 13 (1967). For a plea that the Court use the
strict historical test because jury trial is very inefficient and ought to be restricted, see Red-
ish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Decision
Making, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 486, 489 (1975).
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tices in 1791 were not uniform.2 26 It has been noted, too, that the common
law itself was then in a state of change2 7 and that in terms of common
law principles there is nothing sacrosanct about the year 1791 that war-
rants binding the Constitution to the details of its practices.2 s Addition-
ally, judicial decision according to a historical standard will yield illogical
and unfair results.22 9 Finally, it has been argued that the strict historical
approach would stultify doctrinal development in areas where the very
survival of the judicial system demands reform and in areas where the
framers of the seventh amendment never intended the amendment to ex-
ert its influence.230
B. Common Law Analogue
Frequently the Court will find that a right to jury trial exists in a newly
devised cause of action if that cause of action has a roughly equivalent
1791 counterpart. 3 1 The Court used this approach in Curtis v. Loether2u
where the plaintiff, a black woman, charged the defendant with a viola-
tion of fair housing provisions of the 1968 Civil Rights Act. Finding the
plaintiff's cause of action an analogue of a common law tort claim, the
Court ruled the defendant entitled to a jury trial in spite of the plaintiff's
objection to the delay and the possible racial prejudice against her that
would ensue from a jury trial.3 3
226. For comments about difficulties with the historical approach, see Henderson, The
Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REV. 289, 335-37 (1966); Shapiro &
Coquillette, supra note 141, at 448-50; Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh
Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REv. 639, 652-53 (1973).
227. Wolfram, supra note 226, at 736.
228. Id. at 731.
229. See text accompanying notes 96-101; McWilliams, Federal Antitrust Decrees:
Should They Be Given Conclusive Effect in a Subsequent Private Action?, 48 Miss. L.J. 1,
25 (1977) (strict historical test begs the question of which informing principle is meant to
guide the amendment's application).
230. 319 U.S. 372. See Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 141, at 454-55.
231. Often the Supreme Court uses the common law analogue idea to decide whether a
jury trial right extends to actions brought to enforce newly created statutory rights. Kane,
Civil Jury Trial: The Case for Reasoned Iconoclasm, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 12-13 (1976). Of
Congress' power to create statutory rights with or without a right to jury trial, Kane
observes:
If Congress wants to provide for summary proceedings in areas traditionally tried
at law, it must do so explicitly and with clearly expressed, well-documented reasons
why a jury trial has become an inadequate procedure. Congress cannot simply pro-
vide that a statutory cause of action which historically would have provided a jury
trial must now be tried to the court .... Exceptions to these rules appear... if the
character of the action . . . no longer resembles ... [a] common law counterpart
such as in statutes providing for workmen's compensation and no fault insurance.
Id. at 24-26.
But see 565 F.2d at 822 (common law analogue approach unsatisfactory).
232. 415 U.S. 139 (1974).
*233. Id. at 194. See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, wherein a landlord
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C. Fundamental Elements
The Court has used a fundamental elements approach on occasion to
reach the decision that a particular post-1791 procedure does not result in
an unconstitutional deprivation of right to jury trial. In the leading case,
Galloway v. United States,234 the petitioner claimed that granting a mo-
tion for a directed verdict against him was a violation of his right to jury
trial.2 35 Even though in 1791 the trial court had the power to withdraw a
case from the jury by a party's demurrer to his opponent's evidence, the
demurring party was forced to assent to the truth of his opponent's evi-
dence; denial of the challenge led to adjudication by the judge.28 The
Galloway petitioner argued that his opponent faced no similar risk when
he moved for a directed verdict.2 3 7 Unpersuaded by the petitioner's argu-
ment, the Court wrote that the seventh amendment "was designed to pre-
serve the basic institution of jury trial in only its most fundamental ele-
ments, not the great mass of procedural forms and details varying then
[1791] even so widely among common law jurisdictions. '"23 8 The Court has
repeated its Galloway language again and again239
Although there is agreement that the fundamental elements approach
sought recovery of real property in a summary proceeding authorized by Congress. The
Court held that a right to jury trial existed because the action was the common law analogue
of an ejection action. Both served the same function, in spite of the great differences in
detail and evidence that Congress intended no jury trial. Both Curtis and Pernell, immedi-
ate predecessors to Parklane in the Court's jury trial cases, were cited as an indication that
the Court had returned to the historical approach after a 12 year departure from it. Kane,
supra note 231, at 22-23.
For discussion of the Court's departure from a historical approach, see text accompanying
notes 244-63 infra.
234. 319 U.S. at 372.
235. Id. at 388.
236. Id. at 390.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 392. Justice Black, dissenting, observed that the risk imposed on the chal-
lenger served to prevent a frivolous demurrer to the evidence. Id. at 403. See also Note,
Mutuality of Estoppel and the Seventh Amendment: The Effect of Parklane Hosiery, 64
CORNELL L. REV. 1002, 1021-22 n.78 (1979) (reasoning of Galloway majority opinion sus-
pect). In Parklane, Justice Rehnquist approved the Galloway result, calling the motion for
directed verdict substantially equivalent to the demurrer to the evidence, 439 U.S. at 346.
Although he endorsed the Galloway result, he also cited Justice Black's dissent in Galloway
to lament the gradual erosion of the seventh amendment. Id. at 340.
239. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 156 (1973) (in civil suit, a jury of six not violative of
seventh amendment). See also Baltimore & Caroline, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935)
(judgment n.o.v. not violative of seventh amendment); Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlain
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) (though not permitted at common law, allowing court to
order partial new trial preserves substance of jury trial right); Walker v. New Mexico &
S.P.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (where jury's answers to specific interrogatories conflict




is sound in its refusal to tie the Court to specific 1791 procedures,2 40 there
has been recognition that analyses purporting to retain fundamental ele-
ments are dangerously amorphous.24'1 They invite subjectivism2 42 and ob-
scure the fact that the Court is simply subordinating one principle to an-
other. Unless the Court defines the core and the contours of a
fundamental right to jury trial, it remains free to call any legal doctrine a
mere procedural detail.2 43
D. Complications in Seventh Amendment Analysis as a Result of
Merger
The merger of law and equity courts complicated seventh amendment
analysis. A line of cases beginning with Beacon Theatres v. Westover
shows that the Court has departed from its traditional approaches and
has determined the right to jury trial not by a reference to 1791 practices
but by reference to one of the criteria that determined equitable jurisdic-
tion in 1791.244 Noting that inadequacy of remedy at law was a basis for
equitable jurisdiction in 1791, the Beacon Court held that legal jurisdic-
tion and its concomitant right to jury trial can be determined by the pre-
sent day adequacy of the legal remedy.24 Because merger and procedural
reform have afforded litigants more satisfactory legal remedies, the scope
of legal jurisdiction has thus expanded.2 4 6
It has been suggested that this expanded right to jury trial is limited to
the sphere of cases where analysis has been complicated by merger and
procedural reform. 24 7 Since preservation of the minimum standards of
that right is the only concern of the seventh amendment, the expansion
of the right maybe a matter of judicial policy rather than of constitutional
imperative.2 4 8 Finally, it has been noted that the Court might use the new
approach to validate other nonhistorical approaches that diminish the
right to jury trial.2
240. Wolfram, supra note 226, at 652.
241. Note, supra note 238, at 1026-28, (decisionmaking by characterization).
242. Id.
243. This was Rehnquist's argument in Parklane. 439 U.S. at 347.
244. See James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655, 687 (1963);
McCoid, supra note 225, at 12.
245. 359 U.S. at 508. See text accompanying notes 249-52 infra.
246. Id.
247. McCoid, supra note 225, at 12.
248. Id.
249. F. JAMES, CIVM PROCEDURE § 8.10 (1965). Defendants in an administrative proceed-
ing are not entitled to a jury trial even though the remedy sought makes the action seem
legal. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm., 430 U.S. 442
(1977) where plaintiffs protested the determination of a fine against them in an administra-
tive proceeding. They claimed that the seventh amendment entitled them to a jury trial
since the fine constituted a legal claim for damages. The Court disagreed. It held that "in
cases in which 'public rights' are being litigated-e.g., cases in which the Government sues
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In Beacon Theatres the Court enunciated the following policy. "The
basis of injunctive relief in the federal courts has always been irreparable
harm and inadequacy of legal remedies .... As such their existence to-
day must be determined not by precedents decided under discarded pro-
cedures but in the light of the remedy now made available. '250 Subse-
quently, in Dairy Queen v. Wood,2 51 the Court reaffirmed this
approach.2 52
The approach in these cases culminated with Ross v. Bernhard253 where
the Court went beyond its Beacon standard. In Ross, the Court examined
a traditionally equitable cause of action, the shareholder's derivative
suit,2 " and divided the claim into its component issues. Finding the main
issue to be a request for damages, the Court declared the entire claim to
be legal and the parties entitled to a jury trial.2 55 The Court decided that
the equitable facet of the suit, the standing of the shareholders to sue,
could be resolved at law now that merger presented no procedural imped-iment.2" Logically, perhaps, the nature of the central issue should charac-
terize the entire claim. But logical appeal cannot obscure the fact that
Ross is unfaithful to the historical approach.2 5
Furthermore, in a footnote, the Ross Court hinted that right to jury
in its sovereign capacity to enforce public rights created by statutes," then the seventh
amendment does not require a jury trial. Id. at 450.
Collateral estoppel effect also has been given to administrative agency proceedings.
United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966). The following fac-
tors are considered in deciding whether determinations of an agency acting in a judicial
capacity will receive collateral estoppel effect: adequacy of notice to the parties, right to
counsel, right to subpoena witnesses, right to present arguments through documentation
and examination of witness, and opportunity for judicial review. Note, The Collateral Es-
toppel Effect of Administrative Agency Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEo. WASH.
L. REv. 65, 87-90 (1977).
250. 359 U.S. at 507.
251. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
252. Id. at 478. Plaintiff in Dairy Queen sought an accounting to establish the amount of
money defendant owed him from an alleged breach of contract. Plaintiff contended that
defendant was not entitled to a jury trial because an accounting was a purely equitable
claim. The Court disagreed. Noting that present day inadequacy of the legal remedy deter-
mined equitable jurisdiction, the Court stated that because the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure allow a court appointed master to help the jury with very complicated issues, it would
be a rare case in which the legal remedy in an accounting was inadequate. Id. The Court
noted, too, that modem procedural changes that have cured formerly inadequate legal reme-
dies will cause the scope of equitable jurisdiction to diminish. Id. at n.19.
253. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
254. 396 U.S. at 538-91. See Note, Ross v. Bernhard: Uncertain Future of the Seventh
Amendment, 81 YALE L.J. 112, 119 (1971).
255. 396 U.S. at 538-39.
256. Id. at 539-40.
257. Kane, supra note 231, at 10-11; Note, supra note 231, at 1119. However, since Ross,




trial might be determined also by the practical limitations and abilities of
the jurors.5 8 A complexity exception for the right to jury trial suggests a
blatantly functional approach. 59 However, both advocates and opponents
of a complexity exception purport to have evidence of 1791 practices sup-
porting their respective positions.2 60 Because the Court mentioned the ex-
ception only in a footnote and because the Court has never repeated it in
the twelve years since Ross, some argue that it cannot serve as an impri-
matur for radical departures from the historical approach.2 61
In this line of cases the Court based its holding on the adequacy of the
modern day remedy rather than on 1791 practices. Since these cases ex-
panded the right to jury trial, the integrity of the seventh amendment
was not compromised.2 2 Critics have suggested that the Constitution
would, however, prohibit the use of the novel approach to abridge the
right to jury trial.20 3
E. Parklane and Other Seventh Amendment Cases
One group of critics claimed that Parklane amounted to a judicial re-
peal of the seventh amendment. From their viewpoint it is said that
nonmutuality cannot be used to deprive a party of a right to jury trial
where he would have had that right in 1791.2" However, it has been
noted that there is no evidence that the framers of the seventh amend-
ment ever intended to limit development in principles of collateral estop-
pel.265 Moreover, the rigid historical approach would place the Court in a
logically untenable position. Access to the jury would depend on whether
the parties in the first suit were the same as those in the second.2" The
central concern of the historical position, however, cannot be overlooked.
The language of the seventh amendment requires a historical approach
because the further the analysis departs from history, the less faithful it
258. 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
259. See Kane, supra note 231, at 11 (welcoming the functional approach implied in the
Ross footnote). But see Wolfram, supra note 226, at 644 (functional approach would give
judge disturbingly broad discretion).
260. See Non-jury Trial of Civil Litigation: Justifying A Complexity Exception to the
Seventh Amendment, 15 U. RICH. L. Rv. 897 (1981) and Arnold, Historical Inquiry into
the Right to Trial by Jury, 128 U. PA. L. Rav. 829 (1980) (no evidence of 1791 complexity
exception). Contra, Devlin, Jury Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of
the Seventh Amendment, 81 COLUM. L. Rav. 43 (1980).
261. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of
Rational Decision Making, 70 Nw. U. L. Rav. 486, 526 (1975); Wolfram, supra note 226, at
644-45.
262. Kane, supra note 231, at 11.
263. Note, supra note 145, at 868.
264. See Note, supra note 158, at 91; Comment, Collision Course: Collateral Estoppel
and the Seventh Amendment: Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 57 DEN. L.J. 115, 126 (1979).
265. Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 141, at 454.
266. Id.
1982]
376 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16:341
is to the command of the language.
The Parklane Court's dedication to preserving only the fundamental
elements of the right to jury trial is amply supported by precedent, but
those fundamental elements remain undefined.2 67 Unless the Court estab-
lishes criteria for their isolation and delineates an absolute boundary for
the right, the Court will be free to call any reform that limits access to
the jury a mere incident or detail.268
The Parklane Court characterized its holding as a natural extension of
Beacon,6 9 but Beacon applied primarily to new remedies that were a con-
sequence of merger.27 0 Also, Beacon, as the Rachal court noted, mani-
fested great respect for jury trials.27 '1 The Parklane Court's reliance on
Beacon for the proposition that jury trials may be dispensed with is awk-
ward. 272 But this Beacon-Parklane incompatibility is only apparent be-
cause Beacon addressed a different situation (the situation of several
claims embodied in one suit) and because Beacon recognized, even within
the one suit situation, the possibility of exceptions to its rule.27 3 The
Parklane Court cited Katchen v. Landy,27 4 a successor to Beacon, as a
permissible exception to the Beacon rule and as a sanction for its own
holding.275 In Katchen, the Court permitted equitable determination of
issues in a bankruptcy court even though that determination would have
collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent legal suit.2 7 6
267. See notes 234-39 supra and accompanying text.
268. See notes 240-43 supra and accompanying text.
269. 439 U.S. at 335.
270. McCoid, supra note 225, at 15.
271. 435 F.2d at 64. See Comment, supra note 264, at 124 (Parklane subverts thrust of
Beacon).
272. The Parklane Court characterized Beacon's holding as "no more than a general pru-
dential rule." 439 U.S. 334. Beacon manifested great respect for jury trials, but the Court
seemed anxious to minimize its impact. Note that Beacon implied that its rule was constitu-
tionally mandated. 359 U.S. at 510.
The Parklane Court's position requires careful circumvention of Beacon. The Parklane
Court claims that Beacon recognized an estoppel effect but then disclaims the magnitude of
Beacon's concern with the jury trial right. Finally, the Parklane Court claims its fact situa-
tion falls within the exceptions recognized by Beacon. See note 273 infra and accompanying
text.
See Comment, supra note 264, at 125 (view that Meeker v. Ambassador Oil Corp., 307
F.2d 875 (10th Cir. 1962), rev'd per curiam, 375 U.S. 160 (1963) criticizes Parklane's reli-
ance on Beacon).
For a clarification of the different propositions Beacon has been claimed to support, see
Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 141, at 445-46.
273. 359 U.S. 510. The Beacon Court held that when trying legal issues first would
threaten irreparable harm to a party, the trial court might in its discretion decide to try the
equitable issues first. See note 174 supra for facts and central holding of Beacon.
274. 439 U.S. 322, 334 (quoting Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 339 (1966)).
275. 439 U.S. at 334.
276. Petitioner in Katchen claimed that a bankruptcy court's summary order that he sur-
render certain alleged voidable preferences was a denial of his seventh amendment right to
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Parklane fits comfortably within the framework of the Court's prior
seventh amendment analysis. Yet, even though the Court used historical
allusions, it cannot be denied that elsewhere and in Parklane the flexible
approach represents a balancing of competing interests.2 "7 Parklane is
reasonable if assessed in terms of competing policies.278 An equitable
judgment did have estoppel effect in a court of law in 1791.279 Expansion
of the, effect to include nonmutual parties does not depart from the 1791
practice in a major way. Moreover, the incursion on the 1791 model is not
significant because there is no evidence that framers of the seventh
amendment intended the right to trial by jury to provide citizens with a
defense to collateral estoppel.2 10 Hopelessly crowded court dockets, judi-
cial embarrassment from inconsistent judgments, and harrassment from
multiple lawsuits demand the development of collateral estoppel.2 81 There
is no logical reason to deny the effect merely because of an absence of
mutuality.
V. THE Parklane Impact - Use or Abuse?
A. Current Scope of Offensive Collateral Estoppel
The Parklane rule was neither a blanket approval nor rejection of the
collateral estoppel doctrine, but rather was a recognition that under cer-
tain circumstances offensive collateral estoppel is a useful doctrine. The
jury trial. The Court held that bankruptcy proceedings were one of the permissible excep-
tions to the rule of Beacon; providing a jury trial would destroy the procedure Congress had
prescribed in the Bankruptcy Act. 382 U.S. at 339.
277. See Comment, supra note 158, at 735; Comment, Offensive Collateral Estoppel:
Reconciling the Jury Trial Right and Judicial Convenience - Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc.
v. Shore, 5 U. DAYTON L. REV. 207, 211 (1980).
278. For policy considerations, see Note, supra note 145, at 871-73; Comment, The Effect
of SEC Injunctions in Subsequent Private Damage Actions - Rachal v. Hill, 71 COLuM. L.
REV. 1329, 1337 (1971) (misallocation of SEC effort if private plaintiff is unable to derive
estoppel benefit); Comment, Federal Courts and Procedure - Collateral Estoppel - Col-
lateral Estoppel Effect on Prior Equitable Determinations in SEC Actions Upon Subse-
quent Private Legal Actions Does Not Violate the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury
Trial, 10 CuM. L. REV. 619, 631 (1979) (makes subsequent class action suit a police weapon
.for the SEC). See also Comment, supra note 140, at 358-61 (allowing defendant consent
decree by right may frustrate goals of antitrust law).
279. Shapiro & Coquillette, supra note 141.
280. Id.
281. For a comment that Parklane's impact on judicial economy is mixed, see Comment,
Judgments - Res judicata - Estoppel - Right to Trial by Jury - A Party Who Had
Issues Determined Against Him in a Prior Equity Action May Be Collaterally Estopped
from Relitigating Identical Issues in a Subsequent Legal Action Notwithstanding the
Nonmutuality of the Parties, and Without Violating the Right to a Jury Trial, 48 CIN. L.
REV. 611, 619 (1979). See also Note, supra note 238, at 1018 (length of administrative
agency litigation will increase and frustrate main goal of agency proceedings); Note, Collat-
eral Estoppel and the Right to a Jury Trial, 57 NEBRAsKA L. REV. 863, 875-76 (1976)
(threat of estoppel will increase SEC power to obtain consent decrees requiring as much
private litigation as if there were no estoppel effect).
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Court did offer guidelines for determination of its applicability and did
articulate instances where its use should be avoided:28 2 "The general rule
should be that in cases where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the
earlier action or where,. . . for other reasons, the application of offensive
collateral estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should
not allow [its] use .... 288
The unfairness concept includes instances where a defendant did not
vigorously litigate because of nominal damages or lack of foreseeability
regarding potential exposure,284 where reliance is placed on a judgment
which is itself inconsistent,8 5 where the second action provided procedu-
ral opportunities not available in the previous action,26 and where for
other reasons, use would be unfair.287 Then the Court, in a step by step
approach, applied these guidelines to the facts before them and con-
cluded that application of offensive collateral estoppel was appropriate.
The Supreme Court displayed its own uncertainty regarding the scope
of offensive collateral estoppel when it defined the doctrine by identifying
instances where the doctrine is inapplicable. Currently, the doctrine is
best defined by examination of its application in various circumstances
and of any trends in the use of "broad discretion" by federal courts.
There is great potential for the use or abuse of collateral estoppel by
skillful and imaginative courts and attorneys. In an extreme situation, a
court may have to decide the applicability of collateral estoppel between
a "wait and see" plaintifi s and a defendant who has the resources and
ingenuity to litigate the same issue indefinitely. Clearly, a court's ability
to use broad discretion provides the only appropriate resolution to this
problem.
B. Supreme Court Decisions following Parklane
In Montana v. United States, 289 the Supreme Court emphasized sev-
282. 439 U.S. at 330.
283. Id. at 331.
284. Id. at 330-31. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3
App., 1976).
285. 439 U.S. at 330. See cases cited in note 314 infra; Katz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 84 F.R.D.
378 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (possible jury compromise barred use of offensive collateral estoppel);
accord, lB J. MooRE, supra note 2, at § 0.443[4]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
88(4) (Tent. Draft No. 3 App., 1976).
286. 439 U.S. at 330. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980).
287. 439 U.S. at 331. See Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 215 (2d Cir. 1980)
(offensive collateral estoppel denied because naturalization litigation was an issue of na-
tional concern which necessitated re-examination of the issue).
288. 439 U.S. at 330.
289. 440 U.S. 147 (1979). The Government, in a second action in federal court, was barred
from relitigating the issue of validity of gross receipts tax imposed on public contractors.
The issue had been decided adversely by the Montana Supreme Court. Although this is a
defensive application of collateral estoppel, the Court examined other instances where col-
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eral points regarding party and issue identification in the collateral estop-
pel analysis. In looking to substance over form, it held that although the
United States was not the actual litigant in the initial proceeding, it had
significant interest and control in the previous action.2 " This interest and
control dictated that the Government be precluded from relitigation.
Perhaps in recognition of gaps in Parklane, the Court held that the
collateral estoppel analysis must inquire into whether the issues in each
action were substantially the same, whether changes in controlling facts
or law necessitated relitigation of an issue, and whether other special cir-
cumstances barred preclusion.291 Preclusion, in addition to protecting liti-
gants and promoting judicial economy, now "fosters reliance on judicial
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions. '9 Thus,
the potential impact of collateral estoppel recognized in Parklane was ex-
panded in Montana.
The Supreme Court has maintained its preference for a general rule
and apparently has no intention of narrowing the Parklane rule or of
ranking the factors in the "full and fair opportunity" analysis.23 The Su-
preme Court has expressly stated that it will not fashion any collateral
estoppel doctrine. It will, instead, determine whether the traditional es-
toppel requirements apply in a case by case approach .2' The Court does
mention that policy arguments which promote the use of the doctrine are
factors to be considered.295 The implications of the Parklane test can be
determined only by a review of federal court decisions, for it is there, not
in the Supreme Court, that trends will develop. Limitations inherent in a
"broad discretion" analysis dictate that the remainder of this article focus
on different areas of the law and the application of collateral estoppel to
each area.
lateral estoppel may result in unfairness to litigants. This decision was announced approxi-
mately one month after the Parklane decision.
290. Id. at 155.
291. Id. Compare the factors examined in Montana with those contained in RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68.1, 88 (Tent. Draft No. 3 App., 1976). Close scrutiny reveals
acceptance by the Court of most restrictions in the REsTATME'. See generally A. Vestal,
The Restatement (Second) of Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CoRNmL L. Rav. 464
(1981).
292. 440 U.S. at 154.
293. Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411, 415 n.7 (1980). For a discussion of the case, see text
accompanying note 340 infra. Defensive use of collateral estoppel was granted because the
plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and comity between state and federal
courts should be promoted. 101 S. Ct. at 415.
294. 101 S. Ct. at 415 n.7.
295. Id. at 415.
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C. Areas of Law and Use of Collateral Estoppel
1. Tort Actions
a. Personal Injury-Negligence
Collateral estoppel may have valuable application to liability, contribu-
tion, and indemnification problems in tort law. Judicial economy may re-
alistically be promoted by using the doctrine where issues are straightfor-
ward, parties are limited, and the preclusive effect is carefully tailored to
the circumstances. Litigants may effectively use offensive collateral estop-
pel to pin defendants to a previous adverse issue determination; however,
problems arise when offensive use attempts to bar defendants who are
remotely related or to preclude issues which are not sufficiently similar.
In Southern Pacific Transportation v. Smith Material Corporation,2
plaintiff railroad was successful in limiting its liability by offensive use of
a previous declaratory judgment which apportioned contribution based
on degree of fault.2 9 7 The Fifth Circuit anticipated possible abuse of the
ruling and created an exception which cancelled the preclusive effect if
the railroad was sued by a passenger seeking to hold the railroad to a
higher standard of care.2 98
The preclusive effect does not necessarily have to be limited to the
same cause of action. Collins v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Company2 n
indicates that offensive collateral estoppel can be extended to aid a plain-
tiff who has suffered because of the injury or death of another. In Collins,
the wife of an injured automobile passenger was able to use the previous
ruling in her husband's personal injury suit to preclude defendant's reliti-
gating liability in her action for loss of consortium. 00 The district court
held that no injustice was placed upon the defendant as he had already
litigated the issue of liability.
The ability of an individual to reap the benefits of a plaintiff's verdict
is somewhat compromised when the individual is a party to both suits but
in a different capacity. In Alderman v. Chrysler Corporations0 1 the East-
ern District Court of Virginia addressed the application of defensive issue
preclusion. Plaintiff individually brought suit for personal injury and lost.
She then reified as administratrix of the estate of her husband in a
296. 616 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1980). The judgment relied upon by plaintiff held that the
railroad was 25% liable and the defendant truck company 75% responsible for a collision.
Cf. Norfolk and W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey Lumber Co., 221 Va. 638, 272 S.E.2d 217 (1980) (offen-
sive collateral estoppel denied in similar accident because plaintiff did not meet the mutual-
ity requirement which should be retained in common disaster circumstances).
297. 616 F.2d at 113.
298. Id. at 116.
299. 516 F. Supp. 31 (S.D. Ga. 1981).
300. Id. at 33.
301. 480 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Va. 1979).
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wrongful death action based on the same accident.3 0 2 The ruling indicated
that plaintiff, insofar as her own interests were involved, was precluded
from relitigating the issue of breach of warranty. Claims of beneficiaries
who had not had their "day in court" were not precluded. 3
Because the area of tort law allows for many interpretations of negli-
gence3°4 and contributory negligence standards, it may be unfair for a
previous judgment to bind a defendant where the elements of the stan-
dards are significantly different. Concern will be raised when a previous
judgment which barred recovery because of contributory negligence sub-
sequently is used to preclude liability litigation in a comparative negli-
gence jurisdiction. As Parklane indicates, it will be in the discretion of
the trial court to review the issue and determine whether interests of fair-
ness compel relitigation of the issue.30
Offensive collateral estoppel, when correctly applied, may reduce the
amount of time and resources required of courts and litigants. When a
careful judge, using "broad discretion," constructs a concise pretrial order
or grants partial summary judgment limiting the scope of issues and evi-
dence to be presented, both parties to the lawsuit may enjoy benefits s
b. Products Liability Actions
The use of offensive collateral estoppel in products liability actions in-
volves both potential benefits and risks to the litigants.30 7 The benefits
may be recognized when a defendant has manufactured a product which
causes injury to numerous plaintiffs and the issues presented in each ac-
302. Id. at 604. The district court had to balance the unfairness of allowing Alderman to
relitigate the breach of warranty allegation against the unfairness of preclusion to benefi-
ciaries who were not parties to the first suit. The issue is further complicated since Alder-
man was obviously a beneficiary under the second suit.
303. Id. at 608.
304. See Young v. United States, 518 F. Supp. 921 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Offensive collateral
estoppel was refused in action brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Government
was allowed to relitigate adequacy of warnings and consent form for swine flu vaccination
which had been held inadequate under Ohio law. The district court held that collateral
estoppel did not apply so that adequacy of warning could be determined by New York and
federal standards. But see Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979).
305. 439 U.S. at 331.
306. See Friends for all Children, Inc., v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 497 F. Supp. 313, 315
(D.D.C. 1980). A previous decision regarding causation of injury to infant airline passengers
precluded defendant's relitigation of that issue. The case demonstrates the effective use of
motions in limine, motions for partial summary judgment, pretrial orders, and special ver-
dicts of juries to appropriately identify precluded issues. Id. at 315-16.
307. See generally Weinberger, Collateral Estoppel and the Mass Produced Product: A
Proposal, 15 NEW ENGLAND L. REV. 1 (1979). The author recognizes the potential unfairness
to manufacturer-defendants of the use of offensive collateral estoppel and proposes to limit
its use by preserving the privity requirement and by narrowing the use to situations where
the product defects are proven by empirical evidence.
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tion are identical. However, injustice to a defendant may result when is-
sues are not narrowly construed and the preclusive effect is too expansive.
Asbestos litigation, particularly in the district courts of Texas, exemplifies
the potential for both use and abuse.
In Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation,308 plaintiff was able to
preclude two defendant manufacturers from relitigating several issues
which were elements of the strict liability allegation.309 This was a dis-
turbing ruling because one manufacturer had not been involved in previ-
ous litigation and did not manufacture the type of product which had
been the subject of litigation.310 The use of offensive collateral estoppel
established for the plaintiffs that products containing asbestos were de-
fective and unreasonably dangerous to users, that asbestos was a known
cause of lung disease and that no "state of the art" evidence could be
presented.31' After determining that threshold collateral estoppel had
been satisfied, 12 the district court held that no additional procedural ad-
vantages were present,313 inconsistent verdicts did not prohibit preclu-
sion,31' and that estoppel effect was at least foreseeable to defendant
Johns-Manville. 15
In a later asbestos action,$" defendants' challenge to the repeated use
of offensive collateral estoppel was rejected. Defendants, who had not
been parties to previous actions, were determined to have sufficient inter-
ests and relation to allow estoppel to be used against them.5 " Recognizing
308. 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex. 1980). Plaintiffs sued manufacturers alleging strict lia-
bility under RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OP TORTS § 402A (1965).
309, 488 F. Supp. at 838-41.
310. Id. at 841. Co-defendant Certain-Teed was not a party to any adverse judgment in
asbestos litigation. The instant manufacturers' products were cement pipes containing as-
bestos; the previous defendants' products were insulation products. For previous rulings in
asbestos litigation in this jurisdiction, see Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076 (5th Cir. 1973) (insulation products containing asbestos found unreasonably dangerous
to users), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242
(E.D. Tex. 1980) (offensive collateral estoppel allowed but plaintiff failed to prove sufficient
exposure).
311. 488 F. Supp. at 841-42.
312. Id. at 840.
313. Id. at 841. The district court reasoned that federal procedural rules currently in ef-
fect were those operating at the time of previous actions for which collateral estoppel effect
was sought.
314. Mooney v. Fibreboard Corp., 485 F. Supp. 242 (E.D. Tex. 1980). For cases in other
jurisdictions which rejected offensive collateral estoppel, see McCarty v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp., 502 F. Supp. 355 (S.D. Miss. 1980); Tretter v. Johns-Manville Corp., 88 F.R.D.
329 (E.D. Mo. 1980).
315. 488 F. Supp. at 841. The court did not state whether the estoppel effect was foresee-
able by defendant Certain-Teed. Query: would the unforeseeable exception cited in Park-
lane prohibit estoppel effect against Certain-Teed?
316. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
317. Id. at 1361. The Amended Omnibus Order clearly describes the rulings regarding
precluded issues, issues to be proven at trial and the court's desire that "discretion" be
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the potential impact of the decision on defendants who had not partici-
pated in previous litigation, the Texas District Court allowed the manu-
facturers to file an interlocutory appeal to the Fifth Circuit. 18
Although defendants may argue undue hardship, plaintiffs still must
prove the sufficiency of the asbestos exposure, the injury, and manifesta-
tion of that injury.3 19 The ultimate effect of the rulings is unknown. The
Flatt decision should alert asbestos manufacturers nationwide that such
use of offensive collateral estoppel may have significant effect upon the
industry in the future. This rule represents an extreme, if not excessive
extension of the "full and fair opportunity" test and- demands further ju-
dicial review.
In Ezagui v. Dow Chemical Corporation,3 20 offensive collateral estoppel
regarding adequacy of a drug's package insert warning was not prohibited
because of previous inconsistent verdicts.3 "2 The effect of this ruling was
magnified since inadequacy of warnings establishes "a prima facie case of
product defect"3 22 in the Second Circuit. In establishing product defect
through inadequacy of warning, another factor of subjectivity is added,
and the impact of collateral estoppel and the potential for unfairness is
increased.
As indicated by the Flatt and Ezagui decisions the effects of offensive
use of collateral estoppel is unlimited. "Fairness" must be closely ana-
lyzed since the effect of one adverse judgment may be applied to a manu-
facturing defendant currently unidentified. If issues of liability are given
preclusive effect, will this effect extend to cover punitive awards where a
manufacturer is found to be guilty of wanton or wilful misconduct?3 23
reviewed.
318. Id. at 1363. In Brief for Petitioner, Johns-Mansville v. Hardy, No. 81-2204 (5th Cir.,
filed Sept. 18, 1981) Owens-Illinois, urged that the Hardy district court ruling of identity of
interests violated due process because the privity requirements upheld in Parklane had
been violated. See 439 U.S. at 327 n.7. Accord, In Re Queeny/Corinthos, 503 F. Supp. 365
(E.D. Penn. 1980) (offensive collateral estoppel denied in products liability action because
defendant was neither a party, privy, or participant in previous litigation and therefore did
not have opportunity to litigate).
319. 488 F. Supp. at 842.
320. 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979). In the medical malpractice and products liability action,
the plaintiff was able to use a previous decision, Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d
1390 (8th Cir. 1969), to preclude relitigation of the adequacy of a warning for a vaccination.
321. The inconsistent verdict, based upon introduction of new evidence relating to prod-
uct/chemical defect, was Vincent v. Thompson, 50 A.D.2d 211, 377 N.Y.S.2d 118 (App. Div.
1975). This decision was determined not to affect the previous Eighth Circuit decision re-
garding warning.
322. 598 F.2d at 733.
323. See In Re Northern Dist. of Cal. "Dalkon Shield" IUD Products Liability Litigation,
No. C 80-2213 S.W. (N.D. Ca. June 25, 1981) (conditional order certifying nationwide class
of women for litigation of punitive damage claim). The class represents those women who
allege that they have been injured because of their use of the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine
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The application of "broad discretion" in products liability actions must
carefully balance the potential for unfairness against interests in protect-
ing litigants from expense and harassment of relitigation.
2. Criminal Actions
It has been established that resolution of issues in criminal proceedings
may be the basis of collateral estoppel in subsequent civil proceedings. 24
The overall acceptance of the doctrine depends on the verdict reached in
the criminal proceeding and the type of court which is hearing the subse-
quent action. Special interests including defendant's fifth amendment
protections3 25 and the government's interests in prosecution8 26 are factors
which cannot be ignored. Because of double jeopardy protections, the use
of offensive collateral estoppel in two or more criminal proceedings is
questionable. Offensive use of criminal convictions in later civil proceed-
ings is frequent and appropriate. In subsequent civil proceedings, ques-
tions may be raised regarding differences in procedural and evidentiary
practices and the "full and fair opportunity" must be adjusted to appro-
priately analyze the circumstances.
a. Use of Previous Criminal Verdicts in Subsequent Criminal Actions
In Standefer v. United States, the petitioner challenged his indictment
for aiding and abetting.3 27 He attempted to assert defensive collateral es-
toppel because the principal in the alleged activity had been previously
acquitted on certain counts.32 8 Estoppel was sought because the Govern-
ment had been given one full and fair opportunity to litigate issues re-
garding his involvement.
The Supreme Court rejected estoppel because of the undue hardship
which would be placed upon the prosecution. Limitations included re-
contraceptive device manufactured by A.H. Robins Co., Inc. But see In Re Uranium Anti-
trust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980) (preliminary trials as to damages for default-
ing manufacturers have no effect on defendants with liability actions pending). See also In
Re Nissan Motor Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 471 F. Supp. 754 (S.D. Fla. 1979). See gener-
ally Weinberger, supra note 307, at 36-39.
324. Emich Motors Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 568 (1961). See gener-
ally Note, Civil Procedure -- The Admissibility of Criminal Convictions as Collateral Es-
toppel in Subsequent Civil Actions, 13 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 445 (1977); Developments in
the Law, Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92
HARv. L. REv. 1227 (1979).
325. United States v. Keller, 624 F.2d 1154, 1157 (3d Cir. 1980) (estoppel barred introduc-
tion of evidence regarding previous acquittal of defendant).
326. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 24 (1980).
327. Id. at 11. The principal, an Internal Revenue Service agent, had been convicted on
several counts of accepting paid vacations from the head of Gulf Oil Corporation's tax de-
partment. Id. at 12.
328. Id. at 12-13.
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strictions in discovery and evidentiary procedures and prohibition of ap-
peal or judicial review when an acquittal was clearly against the weight of
the evidence.32 9 A proposal for pretrial hearings in a criminal action to
determine possible deprivation of "full and fair opportunity" was rejected
because it would conflict with interests in judicial review and economy.33 0
Perhaps the most important factors considered by the Supreme Court in
estoppel determination were the "important federal interest in the en-
forcement of criminal law"33' and vindication of the public interest.
3 32
The "full and fair opportunity" test merges with fifth amendment
double jeopardy concerns when the prosecutor attempts to use convic-
tions or acquittals offensively against the defendant.333 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals held that application of collateral estoppel must be con-
sidered because of recent multiple statutory offenses arising from one
criminal act.334 Collateral estoppel may protect a defendant not only from
reprosecution but also from introduction of evidence of crimes of which
defendant was acquitted.3 5
b. Use of Previous Criminal Verdicts in Subsequent Civil Actions
The use of a previous criminal conviction in subsequent civil proceed-
ings requires a different analysis of the previous criminal proceeding than
that discussed above. More specifically, emphasis is placed on identity of
parties in the actions, the verdict of the criminal proceeding and the simi-
larities in the factual circumstances.
In Allen v. McCurry,33 6 the Supreme Court held that plaintiff was
barred, in his civil action, from relitigating the constitutionality of search
329. Id. at 22-23. "Under contemporary principles of collateral estoppel [these factors]
strongly [militate] against giving an acquittal preclusive effect." 447 U.S. at 23. See RE-
STATEMENT (SEcOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1976).
330. 447 U.S. at 24.
331. Id. Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68.1(e)(i) and 88(8) (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1976).
332. 447 U.S. at 25.
333. 624 F.2d at 1158-59. Plaintiff, the prosecutor, should not be allowed "two bites of the
apple" and courts should scrutinize any attempts to separate actions which would be analo-
gous to a "wat and see" plaintiff. Id. at 1157. Scrutiny should be similar to that used to
determine whether the plaintiff could have easily joined the first action. 439 U.S. at 331.
334. 624 F.2d at 1157 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970)).
335. 624 F.2d at 1157. See United States v. Mespoulede, 597 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1979). But
see Oliphant v. Koehler, 594 F.2d 547 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 877 (1979). The
Keller court did not reach a conclusion regarding the constitutional scope of collateral es-
toppel. 624 F.2d at 1159-60. Because of inter-circuit conflict, the extension of constitutional
scope will probably be offered to the Supreme Court for review.
336. 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980). Plaintiff had been convicted on heroin and assault charges. He
then filed a civil action suit based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1979). See Engleman v. Harvey, 518
F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (plaintiff collaterally estopped from relitigating illegality of a
wiretap).
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and seizure because the issue was thoroughly addressed in the state court
criminal proceedings. 3 7 Relying on Montana, the Court held that essen-
tial issues of fact previously determined could be used to preclude litiga-
tion in a party's different cause of action. Plaintiff's inability to file a
federal habeas corpus was determined not to compromise his "full and
fair opportunity" afforded in the criminal proceeding and appeal.38s
A criminal conviction may be used offensively in a civil action to pre-
clude defendant's claim that no wrong was committed. These situations
must be closely examined so that only identical issues are precluded. In a
civil suit for damages resulting from deprivation of constitutional rights
and assault and battery,39 a plaintiff was able to benefit from defendant's
previous criminal conviction. To promote and maintain consistency in
judgments, the district court allowed collateral estoppel to apply to the
pendent state claim based on assault and battery since the issues regard-
ing the intentional tort in the civil and criminal proceedings were
identical.140
Previous criminal decisions are more frequently used for estoppel pur-
poses in civil proceedings because of the nature of burden of proof. It has
been held that a previous acquittal in a criminal action did not bar reliti-
gation of the issue in a civil action.34 1 The rationale was that there may
have been enough evidence to convict on a preponderance of the evidence
even though there had not been enough to convict on the criminal stan-
dard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 42 When there has been a conviction
based on the criminal standard, there is a strong implication that the pre-
ponderance standard would also be met.3'3
In determining the use of collateral estoppel based on previous criminal
proceedings, it is necessary to examine the identity of the party seeking
estoppel, the type of proceedings, the possibility of constitutional consid-
erations and the presence of any special interests or concern. The courts
demonstrate some reluctance in applying estoppel against the Govern-
337. 101 S. Ct. at 413.
338. Id. at 418.
339. Vela v. Alvarez, 507 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. Tex. 1981). See Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d
1074, 1075 (5th Cir. 1980) (criminal indictment for securities violation used defensively in
civil action to prohibit relitigation of plaintiff's knowledge of illegality).
340. 507 F. Supp. at 890-91. To do otherwise would ignore the criminal conviction and
defeat the purposes of collateral estoppel as stated in Parklane.
341. See Shimman v. Frank, 625 F.2d 80 (6th Cir. 1980) (dismissal of federal charges for
assault and battery did not prohibit litigation by private litigant in civil court).
342. Id. at 89.
343. See SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167, 174 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(plaintiffs sought injunctive relief for future violations). "Because of the higher standard of
proof and the numerous safeguards surrounding a criminal trial, a conviction. . . is conclu-




ment unless there is a clear double jeopardy violation. Private litigants,
especially those who may have been victims of criminal activity, may be
afforded estoppel benefit. They must prove that issues essential to their
civil proceeding are identical to those essential to a previous criminal con-
viction. The threshold requirements of Parklane and Montana are essen-
tial whenever a collateral estoppel argument is based on previous criminal
proceedings.
3. Administrative Proceedings
The use of an administrative determination with collateral estoppel ef-
fect was approved by the Supreme Court in United States v. Utah Con-
struction & Mining Co.8" There have been many challenges to this use
because some judicial safeguards are absent in administrative hearings.
Again, the "full and fair opportunity" test must be adjusted and balanced
against special governmental interests in promoting confidence in the ad-
ministrative agency.us It is conceivable that both the fairness to litigants
and confidence in agencies may be maintained when courts appropriately
exercise their discretionary power.
Continental Can Co. v. MarshallI'" strongly illustrates the application
of fairness principles in administrative and subsequent civil proceedings.
In this case, the manufacturer was faced with numerous citations regard-
ing noise levels at approximately eighty plants.34 Continental argued that
continual citations and hearings before the Secretary of Labor constituted
harassment and violation of due process."8 The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit analyzed three issues regarding application of estoppel:
1) whether collateral estoppel threshold requirements were met;" 2)
344. 384 U.S. 394, 421 n.18 (1966). The use is approved "when an administrative agency is
acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact properly before it which the
parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate." Id. at 422. See generally Vestal, Re-
litigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55
N.C. L. REy. 123 (1977); Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of Administrative Agency
Actions in Federal Civil Litigation, 46 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 65 (1977).
345. This is not to say that administrative agency decisions should be given carte blanche
approval, but rather interests in consistency and cooperation between the courts and agen-
cies are furthered where decisions are honored by the other party. Since administrative
agencies were organized because of economy and streamlining concerns, prohibition of col-
lateral estoppel would smack in the face of that very purpose.
346. 603 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1979). Continental's previous attempt to use offensive collat-
eral estoppel had been rejected by the OSHA Review Commission. Id. at 593.
347. Id. at 592. Manufacturer sought injunctive relief against present and future prosecu-
tions by the Secretary of Labor. Continental was cited for Occupational Safety and Health
Act violations under 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95(b)(1) (1974).
348. 603 F.2d at 593. Fairness demanded that both parties be bound by previous stipula-
tions and the Administrative Law Judge's ruling that Continental implement only those
improvements which were economically and technically feasible. Id. at 592.
349. Id. at 593-94. The court decided the issue in previous Continental litigation was
identical to the instant one and that differences in noise levels, geographic locations and
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whether the plaintiff had to exhaust all administrative channels, before
obtaining judicial relief;350 3) whether denial of use would bear undue
hardship upon plaintiff so as to justify injunctive relief.5
In determining whether collateral estoppel was appropriate, the "full
and fair opportunity" test was adjusted or expanded to consider proce-
dures unique to administrative hearings. 52 A balancing between the un-
due hardship placed upon Continental in exhausting all administrative
remedies and the exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine favored
protecting plaintiff from repetitive litigation. In gaining the benefit of col-
lateral estoppel, the manufacturer was able to avoid untold litigation ex-
pense and hopefully, to channel those funds to rectify the problems under
consideration.
Often, policy considerations and changes in legal climate 53 dictate that
an issue, which could theoretically be the basis of collateral estoppel, be
relitigated.s In Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. United States E.P.A., 55 the
Environmental Protection Agency was not barred from relitigating the is-
sue on air quality control standards since California's standards were
unique to that state and independent of other states' findings. 56 The
Ninth Circuit upheld the Parklane mandates when it stated that the "cir-
cumstances of each case must provide the touchstone for decision.
Administrative agencies have also been barred from relitigating issues
which have previously been fully litigated in state agency proceedingsss
In United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., the Environmental Protection
Agency sought an enforcement action against a pulpmill regarding water
industrial machinery were insignificant. Id. at 595. The court probably felt that the defen-
dant was changing the rules in the middle of the game, since he earlier stipulated that
findings for one plant would apply to several others. Id. at 592, 595. Issues in the previous
administrative hearing were identical, were actually litigated, were essential to the judment
and were final. See Hughes v. Heyl & Patterson, Inc., 647 F.2d 452 (4th Cir. 1981) (offensive
use denied because issues not sufficiently identical in this action to recover benefits from the
employer corporation).
350. 603 F.2d at 596-97 (citing United States v. American Honda Motor Co., 273 F. Supp.
810 (N.D. 111. 1967) (exhaustion rule not compromised because agencies had made factual
determination regarding the identical issues).
351. 603 F.2d at 597.
352. Id.
353. Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. United States E.P.A., 633 F.2d 803, 809 (9th Cir. 1980).
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. The case is "sufficiently separable from (another] case to warrant reexamination
of legal issues." Id. Perhaps in the area of environmental law, differences in geographic loca-
tion, climate conditions, and population trends will bar collateral estoppel effects between
federal forums. This may be an area where requirements of identical issues may be carried
to an extreme.
357. Id. at 809-10.
358. United States v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 627 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1980).
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pollution discharge permits.", In the interests of judicial economy and
cooperation, the Ninth Circuit held that the relationship between the En-
vironmental Protection Agency and the Washington Department of Ecol-
ogy was "sufficiently 'close' "860 to warrant issue preclusion.38 1 By sup-
porting the state agency, the Court may have attempted to promote
cooperation between agencies who shared mutual interests in
enforcement. 62
Administrative proceedings seek finality in decisions in the same man-
ner as civil proceedings. This finality promotes judicial economy, avoids
needless relitigation, fosters confidence in the agency,36s and maintains
consistency in judgments.3" Because of the interest in economy associ-
ated with development of administrative agencies, collateral estoppel
should be applied when the guidelines of Parklane are met and no unfair-
ness results. The potential fairness or unfairness resulting from the use of
collateral estoppel is only determined by analysis of the use of "broad
discretion" and its adherence to guidelines offered by Parklane.
V. CONCLUSION
The search for a fair and just result in the application of collateral es-
toppel on a case by case approach is the very essence of our judicial sys-
tem today. The mutuality requirement has not been totally eroded; nor
has the application of nonmutuality been exclusively adopted. Both rules
provide a vehicle by which the application of collateral estoppel can serve
judicial economy without sacrificing fairness. Since Parklane the courts
appear to apply neither rule rigidly where unfair results would yield.
Parklane has been a catalyst in the development and change of offen-
sive collateral estoppel. The Parklane Court's adherence to the nonmutu-
ality rule highlighted a struggle within the nation's courts to realize ap-
propriately the goal of collateral estoppel: fairness coupled with judicial
economy. Parklane encourages discretionary practices. The application of
359. Id. at 999.
360. Id. at 1003.
361. Id.
362. Id. See Jackson v. Hayakawa, 605 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
952 (1980).
363. See Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.
1981). The Third Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court, stayed consideration of the
collateral estoppel issue pending final factual determinations of the National Labor Rela-
tions Board. The Supreme Court, by this action, demonstrated its approval of both the
agency's fact finding capacity and estoppel use of previous administrative decisions.
364. See Moore v. Allied Chemical Corp., 480 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Va. 1979). Previous
rulings by Occupational Safety and Health Association barred plaintiff Moore from alleging
that he was unaware of the danger of Kepone in his action for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. The findings of fact which were the basis of collateral estoppel were the
result of admissions and stipulations made in an administrative proceeding. Id. at 386.
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offensive and defensive collateral estoppel in the federal courts after
Parklane demonstrates both the benefits and harms which may result
from the exercise of broad discretion. The Court laid down a general rule
with relatively few guidelines. Future expansion regarding issue and party
identification is unpredictable.
Certain safeguards have been either expressly or impliedly incorporated
into the doctrine; however, these are not absolute. The United States Su-
preme Court noted that the privity requirement will be maintained to
avoid constitutional violations. As evidenced by the Flatt decision, how-
ever, interpretation of privity may be extended so far as to effectively
abrogate the requirement. Also, an examination of all the circumstances
relevant to a particular action promotes fairness in a court's broad discre-
tion. This, too, may be carried to such an extreme that the doctrine is
either misapplied or not applied at all. The instances where collateral es-
toppel should not be applied, as identified by the Supreme Court, are
subject to varying interpretation. This may work to a party's detriment or
advantage. Analysis of the federal courts' application of collateral estop-
pel indicates that the doctrine has and will be a source of debate regard-
ing the appropriateness of discretionary practices.
Inherent in any new doctrine is the tedious process of carving out
guidelines which limit discretion and rigidity. New standards will un-
doubtedly emerge by judicial accretion. The future should eliminate the
extremes, and some degree of predictability and a return to judicial econ-
omy is foreseeable. Perhaps a temporary sacrifice in judicial economy in
order to develop flexible standards is a small price to pay where the goal,
indicative of the doctrine itself, is for a more just result.
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